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CHARTER SCHOOLS, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE,
AND THE NEOLIBERAL TURN IN PUBLIC EDUCATION
Aaron Saiger †
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Regardless whether the American charter school can improve academic
performance and provide effective alternatives to traditional public schools,
its steady entrenchment as an institution portends significant, destabilizing
changes across education law. In no area will its impact be more profound
than the law of religion and schooling. Despite the general view that charter
schools are public schools, charters’ neoliberal character—they are privately
created and managed, and chosen by consumers in a marketplace—makes
them private schools for Establishment Clause purposes, notwithstanding
their public subsidy. This conclusion, which rests in substantial part on the
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris vouchers case, implies that very substantial
amounts of government money could be directed towards religious
institutions as the charter sector expands. State decisions to permit or forbid
religious chartering will determine the magnitude of this shift. But even
states seeking to forbid religious chartering will find that the bottom-up,
market-oriented structure of chartering invites religiously oriented
educational entrepreneurs and parents to exploit the fuzziness of the
categories “religion” and “school” in order to undermine such a ban.
Practical and constitutional constraints upon the regulatory tools that the
neoliberal paradigm makes available to states—rulemaking and exercising
bureaucratic discretion when approving and renewing charters—ensure
that efforts to abolish religion in charters will enjoy only partial success.

† Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. I am grateful for insightful
comments I received from Bruce Cooper, Nestor Davidson, Annie Decker, Richard Garnett,
Abner Greene, Russ Pearce, James Ryan, Nelson Tebbe, and Amy Uelman, and to audiences at
Bar Ilan University Faculty of Law and King’s College London.
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INTRODUCTION
How, and to what extent, may government support religious
practices in public schools? In private schools? These are famous
questions of American constitutional law. The Supreme Court has
addressed them by posing two other questions: What sorts of religious
practices? What kind of support? The answers to these latter questions
are the grist for the multifactor tests and judgment calls that yield
answers to the former. So: students may pray in private school, but in
public school permissibility depends upon what sort of prayer, when
and where it occurs, who conducts and sponsors it, and what sorts of
physical or psychological coercion its context might exert upon pupils. 1
1

See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577
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Public schools are funded by public monies, but whether a state may
lend support to a private religious school depends on the form the aid
takes. If cash, the method and route by which subsidy reaches school is
determinative; 2 if materials, what matters is whether the loaned
materials most resemble books, maps, or films, how the materials will be
used, and by whom. 3
In sharp contrast, constitutional lawyers have generally not asked:
What is a public school? A private school? Instead, federal constitutional
law has treated public and private, as those terms are used to describe
schools, as self-defining. Public schools are the state-sponsored ones,
run by the local elected school board, open to all local children, and
supported with tax dollars. Private schools are, well, the private ones.
They are run by entrepreneurs or like-minded individuals, supported by
tuition and private charity, and need not educate any particular child
beyond duties created by enrollment contracts and the dictates of
conscience. Only a handful of Supreme Court cases—most notably the
ten-year-old school vouchers case, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris—say
anything at all about how to distinguish between public and private
schools. 4 But making this distinction has rapidly become urgent as a
paradigm shift accelerates in American educational governance.
For many decades Progressivism defined the status quo in
American schools. Progressive educational reformers viewed schools as
government instrumentalities, paid for and managed by the state, free of
charge, and common to all. Progressive schools rely for both legitimacy
and mission upon the concept of citizenship: they are popularly elected,
democratically accountable, and teach democratic values. Progressive
education enjoyed extraordinary success, and was nearly completely
dominant in the United States by the second half of the twentieth
century. The result was a dichotomous industry in which public schools
were a particular kind of school—the Progressive kind—and private
schools were the way in which people, for various reasons, opted out of
the civic enterprise of education. 5
(1992); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
2 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388
(1983); cf. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1440 (2011) (finding no
taxpayer standing in an Establishment Clause challenge to a tax credit for religious school
tuition).
3 See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 802–03 (2000) (Thomas, J.) (plurality opinion);
EMMA LONG, THE CHURCH-STATE DEBATE: RELIGION, EDUCATION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE IN POST WAR AMERICA 57–58 (2012); Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the
Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118
HARV. L. REV. 155, 164 & nn.44–46 (2004) (gathering cases).
4 536 U.S. 639; see also Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
5 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), finds a constitutionally guaranteed
parental right to purchase schooling privately. Pierce permits government to regulate private
schools very substantially, although it may not co-opt their private character. See id. at 534.
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In recent years neoliberal approaches have challenged
Progressivism and undermined its ideological hegemony. Neoliberalism
prefers markets to bureaucracies and elevates consumer sovereignty in
place of citizenship. It understands education to be a service provided by
the market, one whose quality is enhanced by competitive pressure, and
to which the criterion of economic efficiency—giving people what they
want—should have full application. The merits of such ideas are widely
and fiercely debated. In this project, however, I accept neoliberalism as
substantially entrenched, and focus instead upon its consequences.
That neoliberalism is here to stay is vividly demonstrated by
America’s burgeoning charter school sector. Charters are the leading
form of neoliberal education in the United States today, educating 1.6
million American schoolchildren. These schools share important
features of traditional public schools. They are publicly funded and
must accept all applicants (or, if oversubscribed, admit students by
lottery). But charters are neoliberal at their heart. They are privately
established and managed. Their public subsidies are per-student and
granted only insofar as individual families choose to enroll their
children in the charter. Charters therefore must adapt to market
demands.
In no area of education law will the destabilizing impact of
neoliberalism be more profound than in the law of religion and
schooling. The well-established principle that public schools must be
secular but private schools are free to be religious is an artifact of the
contingent intersection in time between the era of uncontested
Progressive hegemony and the Court’s elaboration of modern First
Amendment law. That principle, entirely adequate when all schools are
either public in the Progressive sense or fully private, is not easily
applied in a neoliberal world. Does the charter school, publicly funded,
publicly regulated, nominally open to all, but privately run and
dependent on private choices, fall on the public or private side of the
legal line?
I conclude, against the popular, political, and scholarly consensus,
that charter schools may simultaneously accept public subsidy and
engage in religious activity. Where private groups organize schools that
compete to attract students, those schools, for Establishment Clause
purposes, are private schools. This conclusion is both compelled by the
Court’s cases, especially the Zelman vouchers case—which most recent
commentators dismiss as a dead end in education law—and consistent
with broader principles of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
The ongoing expansion of chartering could therefore direct very
substantial amounts of government money toward religious schooling.
How much depends in large part, but not entirely, upon the states. I
argue that states can choose to permit or forbid religious chartering. But
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even states that choose the latter will find that their control over schools’
religious activity is more limited in a neoliberal world than in a
Progressive one. The bottom-up, market-oriented structure of
chartering invites religiously-oriented educational entrepreneurs and
parents to exploit the fuzziness of the categories “religion” and “school”
in order to undermine such a ban. 6 The regulatory tools that the
neoliberal paradigm makes available to states—rulemaking and
exercising bureaucratic discretion when approving and renewing
charter applications—are unequal to the task of fully secularizing
charter schools.
For example, some religious educators have spun charters off from
private religious schools, shedding their explicit religiosity but retaining
aspects of religious culture and preserving structural connections with
their predecessors. Such charters have enrolled their mother schools’
students, repurposed their facilities, hired their teaching staff, and
constituted overlapping boards of directors. Other charters, both spun
off and brand new, have used charters’ ability to emphasize particular
themes to create schools that focus upon the culture and language of
specific religious minorities. These schools eschew parochially
“religious” instruction but teach religious languages and cultures, and
accommodate but do not advocate religious practices. Even more
creatively, some private religious schools have co-enrolled their students
in cyber charter schools. Taking advantage of cyber-students’ ability to
sign into cyber-school asynchronously and from places of their
choosing, such schools in this way transfer to the state the provision and
payment for secular education, even as they guarantee that this
education will continue to take place in a fully religious context. Each of
these kinds of schools is formally secular, but nevertheless incorporates
important correlates of religious schooling unavailable in traditional
public schools.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the rise of
Progressivism and the neoliberal challenge, epitomized by the charter
school movement. Part II canvasses sources of law outside the religion
clauses regarding whether charters are properly categorized as public or
private schools, but concludes that these determinations carry only
slight weight in the First Amendment context. Part III makes the
argument that, for religion clause purposes, charter schools are private
schools that may engage in religious activity, notwithstanding state
subsidy. Part IV demonstrates that states retain the option to restrict
religious expression in charter schools, but that substantial regulatory
and constitutional constraints face states that choose to do so. Part V
concludes with some observations regarding how the neoliberal turn,
6

See infra Part IV.B.
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intended to reshape the relationship between schools, bureaucracies,
and parents, will perturb the always-fraught equilibrium between
schooling and faith in America.
I. THE PROGRESSIVE SCHOOL AND ITS COMPETITORS
A.

The Progressive Public School

The way that American states organize schools has its roots in the
late 1800s, in reforms introduced by common-school advocates and
then perfected by Progressive educators. Progressives, with
extraordinary energy and success, displaced “voluntary and incidental”
community-based schools across the country in favor of their preferred
vision of education. 7 The major features of Progressive education
continue to limn American public schooling today. All children must
attend some school, either public or private. Attendance at a free public
school within one’s local district is as of right. 8 Public school districts
are local governments, 9 whose local electorates select their governing
boards and ratify their budgets. The elected board delegates
implementation to a professionalized and bureaucratized staff. 10
Districts tax and spend, hire and fire. Their programs are secular. 11
Instead of sending their children, for free, to the local public
school, parents can opt out in favor of private education. Private schools
are self-governing. They support themselves not through taxation but
with tuition and donations. 12 They can teach, or eschew, religion at their
discretion. They have no obligation to educate any particular child
beyond duties created by enrollment contracts or the dictates of
conscience. Government regulates them fairly minimally.

7 DAVID B. TYACK, THE ONE BEST SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN URBAN EDUCATION
6–7, 16 (1974). Progressives achieved dominance in some states substantially earlier. See, e.g.,
State ex rel. Ohio Cong. of Parents & Teachers v. State Bd. of Educ., 2006-Ohio-5512 ¶ 28, 857
N.E.2d 1148, 1157.
8 See Julie A. Reuben, Patriotic Purposes: Public Schools and the Education of Citizens, in
THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 1, 11–12 (Susan Fuhrman & Marvin Lazerson eds. 2005); Aaron Saiger,
The School District Boundary Problem, 42 URB. LAW. 495, 500 & n.24 (2010).
9 There are over 14,000 districts nationwide, a number greatly diminished by district
consolidation since the pre-Progressive era. MICHAEL B. BERKMAN & ERIC PLUTZER, TEN
THOUSAND DEMOCRACIES: POLITICS AND PUBLIC OPINION IN AMERICA’S SCHOOL DISTRICTS 15
(2005); Thomas Corcoran & Margaret Goertz, The Governance of Public Education, in THE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note 8, at 25, 33–34.
10 See TYACK, supra note 7, at 131–32; Corcoran & Goertz, supra note 9, at 32.
11 EDGAR L. MORPHET, ROE L. JOHNS & THEODORE L. RELLER, EDUCATIONAL
ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION: CONCEPTS, PRACTICES, AND ISSUES 5–7 (4th ed. 1982).
12 STEVEN L. JONES, RELIGIOUS SCHOOLING IN AMERICA: PRIVATE EDUCATION AND PUBLIC
LIFE 3 (2008).
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Schooling need not be organized in this fashion. Prior to the
twentieth century, in the United States “[t]he terms ‘public’ and ‘private’
did not have their present connotations, and most schools did not fit
neatly into either of our modern categories.” 13 In the 1800s, a
smorgasbord of schooling arrangements were understood to serve a
“public” function but “by contemporary standards . . . were private
institutions,” including privately managed schools that received public
funds. 14 Cooperative arrangements for school purposes between states
and private entities, including religious groups, persisted well into the
twentieth century. 15 The meanings of the terms shifted with time:
“Although modern distinctions between ‘public’ and ‘private’ became
more common in the North by mid-century, this change was slow and
uneven.” 16 Indeed, when Progressive-era reformers attacked the
institution of the “private” school, by the term they meant something
different than what Americans reflexively understood it to mean in, say,
the 1960s or 1990s. 17 Today’s American idea of what makes a public
school is highly contingent. 18
Nevertheless, by the latter half of the twentieth century
Progressivism had achieved ideological “hegemony” in America. 19 The
Progressive public school was long the “taken-for-granted educative
institution for most Americans,” 20 education’s “one best system.” 21 Like
the free press, it was a fundamental “institution of American
constitutional democracy” (although mentioned nowhere in the
Constitution). 22 Its particular characteristics, and their bundling into a
single institution, have been a fixed point in public understanding for
decades. They remain so today. Artists across generations easily evoke a
13 CARL F. KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC: COMMON SCHOOLS AND AMERICAN
SOCIETY, 1780–1860, at 13 (1983); accord STEVEN K. GREEN, THE SECOND DISESTABLISHMENT:
CHURCH AND STATE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 253 (2010); TYACK, supra note 7, at
57.
14 Reuben, supra note 8, at 5; cf. JAMES C. CARPER & THOMAS C. HUNT, THE DISSENTING
TRADITION IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 172 (2007) (listing arguments in favor of public funding
of Catholic schools because such schools, inter alia, would “contribute to the public good”).
15 See SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAW: RELIGIOUS VOICES AND THE
CONSTITUTION IN MODERN AMERICA 57 (2010).
16 WILLIAM J. REESE, HISTORY, EDUCATION, AND THE SCHOOLS 100 (2007).
17 See id. at 99–102; KAESTLE, supra note 13, at 116.
18 “Public” and “private” also bear variable meanings cross-nationally. Nations’ diverse
approaches to public/private and church/state lines in education belie any argument that
Progressive institutions are necessary for secular democracy. See 1 CHARLES L. GLENN & JAN DE
GROOF, BALANCING FREEDOM, AUTONOMY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN EDUCATION 53, 60, 93,
101, 104–05 (2005).
19 JONES, supra note 12, at 2.
20 Id. at 4.
21 See generally TYACK, supra note 7.
22 Jaroslav Pelikan, The Public Schools as an Institution of American Constitutional
Democracy, in THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note 8, at xiii; cf. HENRY ADAMS, THE EDUCATION
OF HENRY ADAMS 33 (1918) (equating the press and the school as fundamental institutions).
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public school by sketching just a few of its classic markers—the hapless
principal, the against-all-odds teacher, the befuddled board, diverse and
distracted students—whether in a Norman Rockwell painting, 23
immigrant novel, 24 teen sitcom, 25 or Hollywood tearjerker. 26 The bundle
of policies that define the institutional structure of the Progressive
public school, however historically contingent, is deeply embedded in
American life and culture.
Particularly important for this Article, during the second half of the
twentieth century, when the Court was most active regarding religion
and schools, 27 Progressive influence was at its apogee. Progressivism did
not itself demand secularism; it opposed “sectarianism,” in the sense of
taking sides in internecine disputes among Protestants, but was
untroubled by pan-Protestant, nondenominational Christian
religiosity. 28 Requirements that public schools be fairly rigorously
secular were imposed by the judiciary, not by the Progressives.
Nevertheless, it was critical that the Court undertook to elaborate
law on the topic in a fully Progressive context. The Court’s cases, along
with treatises and monographs on religion and schooling, therefore did,
and still do, treat the public schools as an axiomatic category requiring
no exposition. Although they described, often at length, the historical
development of public schools, 29 they gave no attention to defining
“public school.” (This approach is in stark contrast with their treatment
23 NORMAN ROCKWELL, SCHOOL TEACHER (HAPPY BIRTHDAY MISS JONES, TEACHER’S
SURPRISE) (1956), available at http://store.nrm.org/browse.cfm/4,3007.html.
24 E.g., HENRY ROTH, CALL IT SLEEP (1934); HERMAN WOUK, CITY BOY: THE ADVENTURES
OF HERBIE BOOKBINDER (1948); BEL KAUFMAN, UP THE DOWN STAIRCASE (1964).
25 E.g., Room 222 (20th Century Fox Television premiered 1969); Welcome Back Kotter
(The Komack Co. Inc. premiered 1975); Head of the Class (Warner Bros. Television premiered
1986); Beverly Hills 90210 (90210 Productions premiered 1990); Glee (20th Century Fox
Television premiered 2009).
26 The modal plot pits a driven teacher’s love of learning against the twin scourges of teen
anomie and official indifference. E.g., THE BLACKBOARD JUNGLE (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
1955); UP THE DOWN STAIRCASE (Park Place Production 1967); STAND AND DELIVER (Warner
Bros. Pictures 1988); DANGEROUS MINDS (Hollywood Pictures 1995); MR. HOLLAND’S OPUS
(Hollywood Pictures 1996); see also Philip French, Au Revoir, Monsieur Frites, THE OBSERVER,
Mar. 1, 2009.
27 KENT GREENAWALT, DOES GOD BELONG IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS? 17 (2005) [hereinafter
GREENAWALT, DOES GOD BELONG]; MARTHA MINOW, IN BROWN’S WAKE: LEGACIES OF
AMERICA’S EDUCATIONAL LANDMARK 85 (2010).
28 See STEVEN K. GREEN, THE BIBLE, THE SCHOOL, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE CLASH
THAT SHAPED MODERN CHURCH-STATE DOCTRINE 30–32 (2012) [hereinafter GREEN, BIBLE,
SCHOOL, AND CONSTITUTION]; LLOYD P. JORGENSON, THE STATE AND THE NON-PUBLIC
SCHOOL, 1825–1925, at 20–23 (1987); LONG, supra note 3, at 88; George M. Thomas, Lisa R.
Peck & Channin G. De Haan, Reforming Education, Transforming Religion, 1876–1931, in THE
SECULAR REVOLUTION 355, 359–60, 378–79 (Christian Smith ed. 2003).
29 VICTORIA J. DODD, PRACTICAL EDUCATION LAW FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
§ 1:05 (2d ed. 2010); GREENAWALT, DOES GOD BELONG, supra note 27, at 13–17; MARTHA M.
MCCARTHY & NELDA H. CAMBRON-MCCABE, PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW: TEACHERS’ AND
STUDENTS’ RIGHTS 28–29 (1987); RICHARD C. MCMILLAN, RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS:
AN INTRODUCTION 79–89 (1984).

SAIGER.34.4 (Do Not Delete)

2013]

4/19/2013 12:06 PM

CHARTERS AND THE NEOLIBERAL TURN

1171

of their other basic category, “religion.” 30) Until the vouchers case,
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 31 the Court itself used “public school”
without even gesturing towards the possible utility of a definition. In the
reigning educational context, this was reasonable: the universe of
schools consisted on the one hand of Progressive-style public schools,
both funded and managed by the state, and classically private schools on
the other, neither state-funded nor state-managed. 32 Hybrid forms, such
as charters, were out of mind.
B.

The Neoliberal Challenge and Its Critics

David Harvey, in his Brief History of Neoliberalism, captures the
departure from Progressive education that underlies reforms like school
vouchers and charter schools when he defines his subject as follows:
Neoliberalism is . . . a theory of political economic practices that
proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating
individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional
framework characterized by strong private property rights, free
markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve
an institutional framework appropriate to such practices. 33

Charters and vouchers replace public sovereignty exercised by local
citizens, which characterizes Progressive education, with consumer
sovereignty exercised by parents shopping for the school that they think
best suits their children. 34 And they supplant Progressive governmental
management, whose core institutions are citizenship, elections,
bureaucracies, and professionalism, with private management.
Neoliberal schools live or die based upon market forces. Neoliberals
argue that markets and market-like institutions can distribute goods
based on private preferences with much greater efficiency, and
correspondingly less welfare loss, than public provision; moreover, they
are relatively less burdened by the shortcomings associated with public
bureaucracies. 35

30 See GREENAWALT, DOES GOD BELONG, supra note 27, at 116–20; MCMILLAN, supra note
29, at 57.
31 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
32 See GREENAWALT, DOES GOD BELONG, supra note 27, at 17–18.
33 DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 2 (2005).
34 See Martha Minow, Confronting the Seduction of Choice: Law, Education, and American
Pluralism, 120 YALE L.J. 814, 842, 845 (2011) [hereinafter Minow, Seduction of Choice].
35 JOHN MERRIFIELD, THE SCHOOL CHOICE WARS 6–7, 10 (2001); Christopher Lubienski,
Innovation in Education Markets: Theory and Evidence on the Impact of Competition and
Choice in Charter Schools, 40 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 395, 396 (2003).
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In the educational context, neoliberalism found its contemporary
voice in the 1990s. 36 Growing disenchantment with educational
outcomes in traditional public schools made room for the neoliberal
argument that market-based schooling enjoys structural comparative
advantages over state-provided schooling. 37 Schools forced to be
responsive to a marketplace would have no choice but to generate
academic achievement. 38 The bureaucratic, state-run school, by
contrast, faces no consequences for failure and therefore lacks incentives
to succeed. 39
Educational neoliberals first concentrated, following the early lead
of Milton Friedman, upon school vouchers. 40 Vouchers are government
subsidies that can be directed either to private or public schools, at
parents’ discretion. Early voucher programs ineluctably led to the
commingling of issues of neoliberal education reform and of
Establishment, because the pool of private schools prepared to accept
the relatively small vouchers available through those programs was
largely religious. 41 After the Supreme Court held in Zelman v. SimmonsHarris that vouchers could constitutionally be issued to private,
religious-school pupils, however, an expected wave of voucher programs
never materialized. 42 Conventional wisdom suggests that vouchers
attracted few Americans, who are mostly content with their own public
schools (even if worried about public schooling generally) and
uninterested in siphoning school funds to the private sector, especially
at the scale required to make the vouchers broadly attractive. 43 But this
account, even on its own terms, is too glib. Vouchers continue to find
36 See PATRICIA BURCH, HIDDEN MARKETS: THE NEW EDUCATION PRIVATIZATION 5
(2009).
37 Jacob B. Michaelsen, A Public Choice Perspective on Public Schooling, in PRIVATE
SCHOOLS AND PUBLIC POLICY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 63, 63 (William Lowe Boyd &
James G. Cibulka eds. 1989).
38 See Michael W. McConnell, Governments, Families, and Power: A Defense of Educational
Choice, 31 CONN. L. REV. 847, 850–51 (1999) [hereinafter McConnell, Governments, Families,
and Power].
39 See generally JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA’S
SCHOOLS (1990).
40 See Milton Friedman, The Role of Government in Education, in ECONOMICS AND THE
PUBLIC INTEREST 123 (R.A. Solo ed. 1955).
41 The proper characterization of the relationship between religious interests and voucher
advocacy is disputed. Some insist that public aid to religious schools was the primary
motivation for vouchers while others contend that vouchers primarily sought to improve
school quality. Compare Minow, Seduction of Choice, supra note 34, at 829–31, with Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 682 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring). See also James Forman, Jr.,
The Rise and Fall of School Vouchers: A Story of Religion, Race, and Politics, 54 UCLA L. REV.
547, 547 (2007).
42 DIANE RAVITCH, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF THE GREAT AMERICAN SCHOOL SYSTEM: HOW
TESTING AND CHOICE ARE UNDERMINING EDUCATION 120–21 (2010).
43 See Forman, supra note 41, at 549–50; Minow, Seduction of Choice, supra note 34, at 832–
33.
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life in various statehouses, the United States Congress, and political
campaigns, suggesting that the issue retains political salience. 44 Perhaps
more important, especially after Zelman bestowed upon them the
imprimatur of constitutionality, vouchers helped to normalize the
market-oriented partial privatization of schooling and make it seem less
alarming. This intellectual and ideological groundwork paved the way
for the rise of the charter school, the most ubiquitous and important
educational reform of the contemporary American scene.
Charters, like vouchers, hold out the neoliberal promise that
competition and entrepreneurialism can produce better educational
results than hierarchy, monopoly, and decision making through
politics. 45 Charter schools do share important features with traditional
public schools. In addition to a self-image that places them within,
rather than outside, of the public school system, 46 they do not admit
privately paying students and may not charge tuition. 47 Only in some
states are charters exempt from the collective bargaining agreements
reached by their local school districts with teachers and other staff. 48
Charters are also prohibited from discriminating among students in
admission. 49 Oversubscribed charters must admit students by lottery, 50
although there is perennial concern that they use strategies such as
location, targeted advertising, and counseling students at enrollment
and re-enrollment to shape their student bodies to their liking. 51
Nevertheless charters are neoliberal at heart. In charters’ ideal form
(state regulations vary), any group that meets basic requirements may
organize a charter school and solicit students. 52 Families may then
44 Sean Cavanagh, State GOP Lawmakers Push to Expand Vouchers; Some Legislation
Would Extend Eligibility to Middle-Income Families, EDUC. WK., Apr. 27, 2011, at 22; Lyndsey
Layton & Philip Rucker, Romney Endorses Education Vouchers, WASH. POST, May 24, 2012, at
A04; Mary Ann Zehr, Capacity Issues Loom as Voucher Support Surges, EDUC. WK., June 15,
2011, at 1 (reporting new, expanded, or potential voucher programs in the District of
Columbia, Indiana, Wisconsin, Florida, and Pennsylvania).
45 See generally JEFFREY R. HENIG, SPIN CYCLE: HOW RESEARCH IS USED IN POLICY
DEBATES: THE CASE OF CHARTER SCHOOLS (2008); MERRIFIELD, supra note 35; TAKING
MEASURE OF CHARTER SCHOOLS: BETTER ASSESSMENTS, BETTER POLICYMAKING, BETTER
SCHOOLS (Julian R. Betts & Paul T. Hill eds., 2010).
46 See infra notes 93–98 and accompanying text.
47 See Julie F. Mead, Devilish Details: Exploring Features of Charter School Statutes That
Blur the Public/Private Distinction, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 349, 367 (2003) (noting this principle
and occasional exceptions thereto).
48 See R. KENNETH GODWIN & FRANK R. KEMERER, SCHOOL CHOICE TRADEOFFS: LIBERTY,
EQUITY, AND DIVERSITY 6 (2010).
49 See Stephen D. Sugarman & Emlei M. Kuboyama, Approving Charter Schools: The GateKeeper Function, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 869, 873 (2001).
50 For typical requirements for open or random enrollment, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 15-184(A) (2012); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. §§ 9-102(3), 9-102.1(b) (LexisNexis 2013).
51 Christopher Lubienski & Peter Weitzel, Choice, Integration, and Educational
Opportunity: Evidence on Competitive Incentives for Student Sorting in Charter Schools, 12 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 351, 361 (2009).
52 See CHESTER E. FINN, JR., BRUNO V. MANNO & GREGG VANOUREK, CHARTER SCHOOLS IN
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choose among traditional public school(s) for which they are eligible
and available charter schools. By enrolling in a charter, a student
redirects from her local public school to the charter some substantial
portion of the government subsidy that the former school would
otherwise have received on her behalf. In exchange for accepting market
discipline (supplemented by regulatory requirements to demonstrate
adequate student achievement 53), charters are exempted from much but
not all the regulatory apparatus that constrains traditional public
schools. 54 They are regulated much less invasively than traditional
public schools with respect to such matters as curriculum, organization,
and discipline. 55 Many states do exempt charters from collective
bargaining with teachers. 56 Within whatever regulatory strictures are
imposed, charters compete for students with other charters and with
other types of schools. If students enroll, a charter thrives. Otherwise it
dies. 57
The charter sector is growing explosively. In 2009–2010, 1.6
million children were enrolled in 5000 charter schools, making charters
five percent of all public schools. 58 By comparison, 500,000 children
were enrolled in 2000 charters in 2000, and there were no charter
schools in 1990. 59 Fifteen school districts enroll at least a quarter of all
public-school students in charters, including big-city districts in New
Orleans, Detroit, the District of Columbia, Kansas City (MO), St. Louis,
Cleveland, San Antonio, and Indianapolis. 60 Most government-funded
schools in New Orleans are now charter schools; 61 other large districts,
including Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston, Philadelphia, and MiamiDade, enroll more than ten percent of their students in charters. 62 Public
school districts in these and other cities are complaining about the

ACTION: RENEWING PUBLIC EDUCATION 15 (2000).
53 Arnold F. Shober, Paul Manna & John F. White, Flexibility Meets Accountability: State
Charter School Laws and Their Influence on the Formation of Charter Schools in the United
States, 45 POL’Y STUD. J. 563, 566 (2006).
54 See MARK SCHNEIDER, PAUL TESKE & MELISSA MARSCHALL, CHOOSING SCHOOLS:
CONSUMER CHOICE AND THE QUALITY OF AMERICAN SCHOOLS 26 (2000).
55 See GODWIN & KEMERER, supra note 48, at 6.
56 See id.
57 See Sugarman & Kuboyama, supra note 49, at 876 (having “satisfied customers”
necessary, though insufficient, for a charter school); Sandra Vergari, Charter Schools: A
Significant Precedent in Public Education, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 495, 500 (2003).
58 INST. OF EDUC. SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2012, at 22
(2012), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2012/2012045.pdf.
59 JOSEPH MURPHY & CATHERINE DUNN SHIFFMAN, UNDERSTANDING AND ASSESSING THE
CHARTER SCHOOL MOVEMENT 28–29 (2002).
60 NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCH., A GROWING MOVEMENT: AMERICA’S LARGEST
CHARTER SCHOOL COMMUNITIES 3 (7th ed. 2012).
61 See generally Robert Garda, The Politics of Education Reform: Lessons from New Orleans,
40 J.L. & EDUC. 57 (2011).
62 NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCH., supra note 60, at 3.

SAIGER.34.4 (Do Not Delete)

2013]

4/19/2013 12:06 PM

CHARTERS AND THE NEOLIBERAL TURN

1175

sizable bite charters are taking from their traditional enrollments. 63 The
two most recent presidents, one of each party, have been charter
boosters. The possibility that chartering will fizzle out seems remote. 64
Fierce debates rage over neoliberalism generally, over neoliberal
education, and over charters in particular. In some quarters
neoliberalism is a fighting word. It is the agenda of those who would
privatize the public, quantify the incommensurable, and privilege the
one percent. 65 After offering the definition that begins this Section,
David Harvey quickly reminds his readers that neoliberalism primarily
has been “a political project to re-establish the conditions for capital
accumulation and to restore the power of economic elites.” 66
Such critiques need not take such doctrinaire forms. Michael
Sandel recently criticized what he views as an undesirable progression
from a “market economy” to a “market society”; his subtitle (“The
Moral Limits of Markets”) suggests what he thinks of overmarketization. 67 Sandel, although he says nothing about neoliberalism
and focuses on the buying and selling of goods that once had no price,
recapitulates two standard critiques of an over-marketized society. First,
it privileges the affluent: “Where all good things are bought and sold,
having money makes all the difference in the world.” 68 Second, Sandel
notes the “corrosive” if “difficult to describe” problem that “[p]utting a
price on the good things in life can corrupt them.” 69 Not all things
should be commodified. 70 The synthesis of private provision and public
funding that characterizes governmental privatization initiatives also
has more technocratic critics, who worry that outsourcing can have the
effect of “[u]ndermining democratic norms of transparency, rationality,
and accountability” and “diminish[ing] government capacity.” 71
These arguments are instantiated in debates over schooling. In
making their case, critics of charters (and, a fortiori, of voucher
programs) adopt the notable rhetorical strategy of playing up the
63

at A1.

Motoko Rich, Enrollment Off in Big Districts, Forcing Layoffs, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2012,

JACK BUCKLEY & MARK SCHNEIDER, CHARTER SCHOOLS: HOPE OR HYPE? 3 (2007).
See Stanley Fish, Neoliberalism and Higher Education, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR BLOG,
(Mar. 8, 2009, 10:00 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/08/neoliberalism-andhigher-education.
66 HARVEY, supra note 33, at 19; accord HENRY A. GIROUX, AGAINST THE TERROR OF
NEOLIBERALISM: POLITICS BEYOND THE AGE OF GREED 10 (2008) (“[Neoliberalism] is an
ideology that subordinates the art of democratic politics to the rapacious laws of a market
economy.”).
67 MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS (2012).
68 Id. at 8.
69 Id. at 9.
70 Id.; accord HARVEY, supra note 33, at 33 (“Neoliberalization has meant, in short, the
financialization of everything.”).
71 Jody Freeman & Martha Minow, Introduction to GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT:
OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 1, 5 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009).
64
65
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public/private distinction. They argue that charters are not a species of
public school reform but instead an attack upon “public schooling”
itself, and thereby upon the public good. Michael Apple objects to
“powerful interests” that, by advocating consumer choice in schooling,
seek to destroy “unions, collective freedom, the common good,
politics, . . . [and] collective deliberation.” 72 Indeed, he accuses
“neoliberal segments of the new hegemonic alliance” 73 in education of
seeking “to radically alter who we think we are” 74 and to “transfor[m]
our very idea of democracy, making it only an economic concept, not a
political one.” 75 Part and parcel with the “entire project of
neoliberalism,” market-based educational reform “is connected to a
larger process of exporting the blame from the decisions of dominant
groups onto the state and onto poor people.” 76
Unlike the general debate over neoliberalism, where wholesale
condemnation on the far left coexists with positions like Sandel’s
opposition to over-marketization and over-privatization, in the
educational debate many mainstream observers argue in ways
substantively indistinguishable from that of the most strident critics.
Diane Ravitch, repenting of her earlier neoliberal sympathies, is
substantially less altiloquent than Apple but echoes his complaint that
“[f]or neoliberals, the world in essence is a vast supermarket.” 77 She
complains, “[t]he rhetoric of many charter school advocates has come to
sound uncannily similar to the rhetoric of voucher proponents and of
the most rabid haters of public schooling. They often sound as though
they want public schools to fail.” 78 She concludes that:
72 MICHAEL W. APPLE, EDUCATING THE “RIGHT” WAY: MARKETS, STANDARDS, GOD, AND
INEQUALITY 9 (2001) [hereinafter APPLE, EDUCATING THE “RIGHT” WAY]. For similar voices,
consider MICHAEL FABRICANT & MICHELLE FINE, CHARTER SCHOOLS AND THE CORPORATE
MAKEOVER OF PUBLIC EDUCATION: WHAT’S AT STAKE? 8 (2012) (stating that charters “have
started to rip communities of color apart”); PAULINE LIPMAN, THE NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF URBAN EDUCATION: NEOLIBERALISM, RACE, AND THE RIGHT TO THE CITY 6–15 (2011);
JAMES RYAN, STRUGGLING FOR INCLUSION: EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP IN A NEOLIBERAL
WORLD 30, 34 (2012) (this James Ryan is not the education scholar James E. Ryan of the
University of Virginia); William H. Watkins, Re-imagining Public Education, in THE ASSAULT
ON PUBLIC EDUCATION: CONFRONTING THE POLITICS OF CORPORATE SCHOOL REFORM 189, 189
(William H. Watkins ed. 2012) (“Corporate, privatizer, free-marketeer, ‘bankster’ neoliberals
are working feverishly to create a narrative for 21st-century education.”); see also James
Forman, Jr., Do Charter Schools Threaten Public Education? Emerging Evidence from Fifteen
Years of a Quasi-Market for Schooling, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 839, 841 (collecting further examples
of similar rhetoric).
73 APPLE, EDUCATING THE “RIGHT” WAY, supra note 72, at 33.
74 Id. at 8.
75 Id. at 15; accord LIPMAN, supra note 72, at 121–22 (“Charter schools have become the
central vehicle to . . . eliminate whatever democratic control of public education there is.”);
Kenneth J. Saltman, Putting the Public Back in Public Schooling: Public Schools Beyond the
Corporate Model, 3 DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST. 9, 24 (2009).
76 APPLE, EDUCATING THE “RIGHT” WAY, supra note 72, at 32.
77 Id.
78 RAVITCH, supra note 42, at 146; accord FABRICANT & FINE, supra note 72, at 123
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[T]he problem with the marketplace is that it dissolves communities
and replaces them with consumers. Going to school is not the same
as going shopping . . . . The market serves us well when we want to
buy a pair of shoes or a new car or a can of paint; we can shop
around for the best value or the style we like. The market is not the
best way to deliver public services. Just as every neighborhood should
have a reliable fire station, every neighborhood should have a good
public school. 79

This wholesale rejection of the neoliberal project in education is
striking. What makes it so clear to these thoughtful and informed
writers that government provision is necessary to education when other
programs guaranteeing important and basic services—food stamps, for
example—operate relatively uncontroversially on a neoliberal
paradigm? Why oppose market provision for schooling in principle? I
do not mean to suggest that there are no answers to these questions.
Particularly important is the claim that education is uniquely needful of
public provision because of deep connections between education and
the practice of public democracy. 80 My point here is that many critics
feel little rhetorical need to make any argument. They assert, rather than
justify, the incompatibility of marketization and the public good. It is
obvious to them that public schools that are public in a Progressive way
are public in the right way, because that is how public schools have been
public for nearly a century. That they argue thus, and expect to be
effective, is testament to the success and deep roots of educational
Progressivism in America.
The debates over neoliberalism are extremely important, but I do
not join them here. This Article is unusual in using the term
“neoliberal” as a purely neutral description without normative
implications. Their wisdom aside, charters and other neoliberal reforms
are now substantially entrenched. 81 Educational neoliberalism is
(“Charter reform . . . neglect[s] the fundamental obligation of every publicly funded institution
to remain accountable to the citizenry financing its work, accessible to those in need of its
services, and just in allocating resources.”).
79 RAVITCH, supra note 42, at 221.
80 See GIROUX, supra note 66, at 114–17. Public schools in the Progressive tradition have
also long arrogated to themselves, qua democratic and public polities, a particular duty to
prepare students for civic life and democratic citizenship, while cultivating doubts about
whether private schools can prepare students similarly. James C. Carper & Thomas C. Hunt,
Taking Religion Seriously: Another Approach, 38 RELIGION & EDUC. 81, 86 (2011); Charles
Fried, Five to Four: Reflections on the School Voucher Case, 116 HARV. L. REV. 163, 168 (2002);
William A. Galston, The Politics of Polarization: Education Debates in the United States, in THE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note 8, at 57, 63; Reuben, supra note 8, at 12–13; Saiger, supra note 8, at
521–23; Paul Weithman, Religious Education and Democratic Character, in RELIGIOUS VOICES
IN PUBLIC PLACES 194, 205–07 (Nigel Biggar & Linda Hogan eds. 2009). Such arguments did
not originate with the Progressives and have roots in the pre-revolutionary and founding
periods. See GREEN, BIBLE, SCHOOL, AND CONSTITUTION, supra note 28, at 13–15.
81 See BURCH, supra note 36, at 2–3.
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unlikely to vanquish Progressivism, but has already displaced its
ideological monopoly in law, on the ground, and in the culture, 82 and
will continue to compete with it for the foreseeable future. How
neoliberal schools will affect various aspects of American educational
governance and law has become critically important. This Article
focuses on a single but vital aspect of this larger question: How will the
rise of charters affect the legal regulation of religion in American
education?
II. THE CHARTER SCHOOL UNDER A PUBLIC/PRIVATE DICHOTOMY
As Part I demonstrates, charter schools are in fact public/private
hybrids, 83 routinely described as “publicly funded but privately run” or
“public but largely independent.” 84 But charters confront a First
Amendment regime that insists upon dichotomy. Public schools face
one set of constitutional rules about religion and private schools
another. This is because—although the institution of public schooling
and the phrase “public school” are famously absent from the United
States Constitution 85—the Supreme Court’s cases interpret the First
Amendment to bar much religious activity in “public schools” while
leaving private schools free to pursue religious missions. 86 The duality is
rooted in the state action requirement, the basic principle that the First
and Fourteenth Amendments constrain governments but not private
persons.
It therefore becomes tempting to think that one can identify which
First Amendment rules apply to charter schools by determining whether
charters are public or private. On this approach, if charters are public
schools, then they are required to be secular. 87 This Part argues that, to
the contrary, whether a school is public school or a state actor is a
context-dependent inquiry. Whether charters are public or private need
not be answered identically for all purposes, for all constitutional
purposes, or even for all federal constitutional purposes. “[W]hen state

See Fried, supra note 80, at 168.
Christopher Lubienski, Instrumental Perspectives on the “Public” in Public Education:
Incentives and Purposes, 17 EDUC. POL’Y 478, 482–83 (2003) [hereinafter Lubienski,
Instrumental Perspectives].
84 See Mead, supra note 47, at 352; Foundations Help Charter Network Secure Bonds, EDUC.
WK., May 12, 2010, at 4.
85 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33–35 (1973).
86 GREENAWALT, DOES GOD BELONG, supra note 27, at 17–18.
87 See Sugarman & Kuboyama, supra note 49, at 874–75. Only rarely in the literature does
one encounter even glancing references to the possibility that charter schools could be religious.
See Laycock, supra note 3, at 184–85.
82
83
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action is found in a particular context, it doesn’t mean that the actor is a
state actor in all contexts.” 88
In the educational arena, this principle was long obscured by the
Progressive hegemony that limited the variety of institutional
arrangements in American schooling. 89 With the waning of that
hegemony it has become indisputable. This Part demonstrates this by
reviewing, in its first Section, the dominant political and policy
consensus that charter schools are public schools. It shows that this
identification is not determinative as a First Amendment matter; it is
both politicized and more contextualized than it might appear.
Subsequent Sections review three areas of law outside the First
Amendment that depend on determinations that schools are public or
private, state actors or not, and that might seem, at first thought, to be
particularly relevant. In each of the three contexts—the education
clauses of state constitutions, actions for damages against charter
schools under § 1983, and the funding of special-needs children enrolled
in privately managed schools—courts and agencies reach very different
conclusions. These depend both upon specific features of the schools in
question and also the purpose and nature of the legal regime for which
the determination of publicness or privateness is important.
A.

Blanket Identification of Charters as “Public” Schools

That charter schools are a species of the genus public is the
prevailing view in policy, political, and popular circles. 90 Uninterrogated
claims that charter schools are public schools are routine if not
ubiquitous. 91 A pro-charter interest group names itself the “National

Alexander Volokh, Prison Vouchers, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 779, 814 (2012).
See supra Part I.A.
90 James E. Ryan, Charter Schools and Public Education, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 393, 405
(2008).
91 See 2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT AND
FAIRNESS 423 (2008) (charters and magnets are among “public school options”); ARNOLD
SHOBER, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA OF AMERICAN EDUCATION: OUT OF MANY, ONE? 196
(2012) (“Charter schools must accept the public accountability of the public school system
because they are public schools.”); Michael E. Hersher, The Law of Charter Schools, in
EDUCATION AND THE LAW 547, 547 (Stuart Biegel ed., 3d ed. 2012) (“Charter schools are part
of the public school system, but they are not the same as regular public schools.”); Martha
Minow, We’re All for Equality in U.S. School Reforms: But What Does It Mean?, in JUST
SCHOOLS: PURSUING EQUALITY IN SOCIETIES OF DIFFERENCE 21, 40 (Martha Minow, Richard A.
Shweder & Hazel Rose Markus eds. 2008) (“Although often exempt from systemwide rules
governing textbook adoptions and even unionization, charter schools operate as public
schools.”); Vicki L. Phillips, It’s Time for Public Schools and Public Charters to Work Together,
EDUC. WK., Jan. 12, 2011, at 29 (presenting the argument of a Gates Foundation official that
society should attack “one of the most persistent divides in public education and accelerate
progress for all of our students: public charter schools vs. traditional public schools”).
88
89
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Alliance for Public Charter Schools,” for example. 92 The publicness of
the charter school has become central to the self-understanding of many
funders, advocates, legislators, politicians, unions, scholars, and
ordinary folk involved in or supportive of the charter movement. It is
difficult indeed, for example, to imagine a Department of Education in a
Democratic administration like Barack Obama’s offering charters the
full-throated endorsement that it has, 93 or that charters could have
diffused so rapidly across the states, were it not plausible to claim that
charter schools are public schools.
This view, however, is not so much a reasoned conclusion as a
framing of a political issue by victorious charter proponents.
Analytically, the identification of charters as public is not
straightforward. “Public school” denotes a bundle of characteristics, 94
and charters clearly share some of them and just as clearly do not share
others. 95
Rather, legislators, politicians, and industry participants harness
the term “public school” in service of charters 96 for the same reasons
that charter opponents paint charters as utterly foreign to the institution
of public schooling. 97 It cannot be, for example, that charters divert
funds from public schools if they themselves are public schools. So the
latter is asserted, notwithstanding that charters self-evidently do divert
public education funds, if by “public education” one means only
traditional, district-run schools. 98 Similarly, charter systems must be
distinct from voucher programs if they are public schools, because
vouchers involve private schools—although charters, just like voucher
schools, are privately run schools that receive public funds when and
only when parents choose to enroll their children in such schools.
It is not only that “public school” carries strong, positive
associations in American politics; 99 the claim that charters are public
92 See NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOLS, http://www.publiccharters.org
(last visited Feb. 2, 2013).
93 See Erica Frankenberg & Genevieve Siegel-Hawley, Choosing Diversity: School Choice and
Racial Integration in the Age of Obama, 6 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 219, 243 (2010).
94 See Forman, supra note 72, at 845; Lubienski, Instrumental Perspectives, supra note 83, at
479–83; Ryan, supra note 90, at 405; Aaron Saiger, School Choice and States’ Duty to Support
“Public” Schools, 48 B.C. L. REV. 909, 935–37, 939–44 (2007) [hereinafter Saiger, School Choice
and States’ Duty].
95 See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Vouchers After Zelman, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 21 (“[A] school
that chooses to accept vouchers becomes a particular kind of public school, less regulated than
charter or community schools but still a public school.”).
96 See Lubienski, Instrumental Perspectives, supra note 83, at 482 (“[P]erhaps because the
general population is largely unfamiliar with educational alternatives, but committed to public
education, many descriptions of such schools emphasize the public aspect in explaining
reforms to the public.”).
97 See supra Part I.B.
98 See generally Rich, supra note 63.
99 Carper & Hunt, supra note 80, at 87 (“[A] majority of citizens and the politically and
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inoculates them from charges that they compete with, and in that sense
threaten, public schools. It frames charters not as an alternative to
public schools but instead as part of a long tradition of public-school
reform from within. It is unsurprising, with charters on the rise, that
this framing is at this moment dominant. But it is hard to regard this as
shedding much light on whether, as a legal matter, charters are public
schools.
One also finds in the legal literature scholars who identify charter
schools generally as “public” state actors. Robert O’Neil, writing before
Zelman, says that charter schools constitute an “[e]asy [c]ase” of state
action. 100 For O’Neil, the close regulation of charters settles the question:
if a charter school were given sufficient regulatory latitude to undermine
its umbilical connection to state authority, “such an entity would not be
a charter school as that term is currently understood.” 101 This analysis
perseveres post-Zelman. “Charter schools most likely would be found
part of the government for constitutional purposes,” writes Gillian
Metzger, “given that they are officially denominated public schools,
often are created by the state, and operate subject to the state’s direct
oversight.” 102 Metzger also notes that charters have “extensive
government involvement” 103 and that “managing a public school
(although not providing educational services) is traditionally the
exclusive prerogative” of government. 104
But O’Neil, Metzger, and other scholars of privatization who agree
with them likely intend no implication that their conclusions about state
action should extend to the First Amendment context. They make no
argument that state action is not context dependent and advance no
First Amendment claims. Indeed, O’Neil distinguishes a religious school
that seeks to “constrain sacrilege or blasphemy on the part of its faculty”
from one that tries to limit teacher speech on secular subjects or
discriminate by race in student admissions. 105
B.

State Constitutional Law of Education

Governors and state legislators feel the imperative to identify
charter schools as public as keenly as any charter proponent. This is
culturally powerful still revere public education.”).
100 Robert M. O’Neil, School Choice and State Action, in SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL
CONTROVERSY: POLITICS, POLICY, AND LAW 215, 220 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Frank R.
Kemerer eds. 1999).
101 Id. at 221.
102 Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1495 (2003).
103 Id.
104 Id. at 1495–96.
105 O’Neil, supra note 100, at 225.
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evident from a review of state charter-school statutes. Even as these
statutes establish rights, duties, and organizational structures that
differentiate charters from public schools as traditionally organized,
nearly every one explicitly provides that charter schools are, by
definition, public schools. 106
These statutory definitions, along with whatever political benefits
they bring, also address a particular legal imperative. Most state
constitutions, many drafted and ratified under the influence of
Progressive educational thinking, use the Progressive language of
“public” or “common schools” in establishing the state duty to establish
schools and students’ rights to attend them. 107 States discharge those
duties and/or fulfill resident children’s rights by funding charters, on
standard readings of these clauses, only if those charters are “common”
or “public.” In a handful of states, this has led to litigation regarding
what constitutes a “public” school.
In Ohio, a facial challenge under that state’s constitution alleged
that the state’s constitutional duty to support a “thorough and efficient
system of common schools” 108 prohibited charter schools from receiving
state monies because charters are not “common.” 109 The Ohio Supreme
Court rejected this argument. 110 It held that the regulatory regime
governing charter school operations was sufficiently governmental, and

106 See ALASKA STAT. § 14.03.255(a) (2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-181(A) (2012); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 6-23-102 (2012); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47601(e) (West 2012); COLO. REV. STAT.
§§ 22-30.5-104(2)(b), 22-30.5-104(4.5)(a) (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-66aa(1) (2012); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 501 (2012); FLA. STAT. § 1002.33(1) (2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-2062(3)
(2012); 2012 Haw. Sess. Laws act 130 pt. I, § 1 (S.B. 2115 at 3, 4); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 33-5202
(2012); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/27A-2(3) (West 2012); IND. CODE § 20-24-1-4 (2012);
IOWA CODE § 256F.4(2)(b) (2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-1903(a) (West 2012); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 17:3973(2)(a) (2013); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 9-101(b) (West 2013); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 89(c) (West 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.501(1) (West 2012);
MINN. STAT. § 124D.10(b)(2) subdiv. 7 (2012); MO. REV. STAT. § 160.400(1) (2012); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 18A:36A-3(a) (West 2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-8B-2(A) (2012); N.Y. EDUC. LAW
§ 2853(1)(c) (McKinney 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-238.29E(a) (2012); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3314.01(B) (West 2013); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 3-132(C) (2012); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 338.015 (2012); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 17-1703-A (West 2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 16-77-3.1(a) (2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-40-40(2)(a) (2012); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 49-13-105(a) (2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-1a-503.5(1) (West 2012); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 22.1-212.5(B) (2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3-303(c), 21-3-304(a) (2012); Sugarman &
Kuboyama, supra note 49, at 873. But cf. Maren Hulden, Note, Charting a Course to State
Action: Charter Schools and § 1983, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1244, 1255 & n.44 (2011) (stating only
that a “majority” of states define charters as public schools and defining axes along which state
statutory regimes differ).
107 See Saiger, School Choice and States’ Duty, supra note 94, at 926–27.
108 OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2.
109 State ex rel Ohio Cong. of Parents v. State Bd. of Educ., 2006-Ohio-5512, ¶¶ 23–26, 857
N.E.2d 1148, 1156–57.
110 Id. ¶¶ 27–34, 857 N.E.2d at 1157–59.
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sufficiently similar to the regime applicable to traditional public schools,
to render charter schools public schools. 111
The Georgia Supreme Court faced both a somewhat different issue
and an idiosyncratic constitutional text in 2011. 112 It held that its
legislature could not itself charter schools pursuant to its constitutional
authority to “provide by law for the creation of special schools in such
areas as may require them.” 113 The court understood the legislature’s
authority to create “special” schools as an exception to the Georgia
constitution’s general grant of authority “to county and area boards of
education to establish and maintain public schools within their
limits.” 114 But charters, the court held, are not “special”: they
“necessarily operate in competition with or duplicate the efforts of
locally controlled general K–12 schools by enrolling the same types of
K–12 students who attend locally controlled schools and by teaching
them the same subjects that may be taught at locally controlled
schools.” 115 The Georgia court explicitly determined that differences
between charter schools’ and traditional schools’ pedagogy,
organization, funding, and susceptibility to the market did not make
charters “special.” 116 The court therefore concluded that charters are
constitutional only if “county and area boards of education . . . establish
and maintain” them as “public schools.” 117
Whereas the Ohio case expands the scope of chartering, the
Georgia case was a blow to charter proponents, who want to be able to
call charters public but want even more to be able successfully to secure
charters. This is difficult when chartering authority rests exclusively
with the traditional school districts with which charters compete. But
both cases emphatically endorse the view that charter schools are public
schools. Moreover, both courts make the same move to reach this
conclusion: they conclude that their states’ charter schools are
sufficiently similar to traditional public schools because the regulatory
regimes that govern them are sufficiently similar. “[W]hile it is true that
community schools are exempted from certain state standards,” writes
the Ohio court, “there are others to which the schools must also
adhere.” 118 The court multiplies examples at length. 119 The Georgia
court goes even further. It declares that charter and traditional public
Id. ¶¶ 33–34, 857 N.E.2d at 1159.
Gwinnett Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Cox, 710 S.E.2d 773, 782 (Ga. 2011) (relevant Georgia
constitutional language is “unique”).
113 GA. CONST. art. VIII, § V, ¶ 7(a).
114 Id. art. VIII, § V, ¶ 1.
115 Gwinnett Cnty., 710 S.E.2d at 777.
116 Id. at 780–81.
117 GA. CONST. art. VIII, § V, ¶ 1.
118 State ex rel Ohio Cong. of Parents v. State Bd. of Educ., 2006-Ohio-5512, ¶ 30, 857 N.E.2d
1148, 1157–58.
119 Id. ¶¶ 110–75, 857 N.E.2d at 1171–74.
111
112
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school teachers alike “teach [their] students in accordance with the same
statutory standards of professional performance that govern the conduct
of all of the State’s educators.” 120 Moreover, “every general K–12 public
school has a ‘unique operating charter’—whether memorialized in
writing or merely implicit in the unique nature of each school’s faculty,
administration and student body.” 121 Charters and publics are really the
same.
In setting out the facts of the cases, both courts note that their
respective legislatures declared charter schools to be public schools. 122
Neither seems inclined to question this assertion. This is not because
these courts are prepared to derogate their authority in this area to
lawmakers. Quite the contrary: the cases reject emphatically the
formalist position that charter schools are “public” because state
legislatures declare them to be so. 123 When a dissenter suggested that the
Ohio opinion “treats the mandate for a system of common schools as
standardless, denoting any schooling arrangement that the General
Assembly decides to support by general taxation,” 124 the majority
emphatically retorts: “[W]e do not approve of just ‘any schooling
arrangement.’” 125 The Georgia court takes the maximalist position that
only the judiciary may construe “a constitutional phrase” 126 like “special
school,” 127 and that the legislature has “no power” to do so. 128 “Public
schools” is also a constitutional phrase in Georgia. 129 So it is not based
upon the public school code that these courts know what a
constitutional public school is; rather, these courts agree with the
legislators that charters fit within the meaning of the constitutional
phrase “public school.”
But the court’s functionalism is only surface-deep. The courts
review at great length the similarities between the regulatory regimes
governing traditional public schools and charter schools; but they never
explain why the nature of the regulatory regime is what matters in
interpreting the constitutional text. Charters and traditional publics are
also similar in having many rooms, and school bells, and blackboards;
Gwinnett Cnty., 710 S.E.2d at 780 (internal citation omitted).
Id.
122 Ohio Cong., 2006-Ohio-5512, ¶ 5, 857 N.E.2d at 1152 (citing 147 Ohio Laws pt. I, 909,
1187); Gwinnett Cnty., 710 S.E.2d at 776 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-2081(2)).
123 Accord Frank R. Kemerer & Catherine Maloney, The Legal Framework for Educational
Privatization and Accountability, 150 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 589, 597–98 (2001).
124 Ohio Cong., 2006-Ohio-5512, ¶ 82, 857 N.E.2d at 1167 (Resnick, J., dissenting).
125 Id. at ¶ 32, 857 N.E.2d at 1159 (majority opinion) (citing id. ¶ 82, 857 N.E.2d at 1167
(Resnick, J., dissenting)).
126 Gwinnett Cnty., 710 S.E.2d at 780.
127 GA. CONST. art. VIII, § V, ¶ 7(a).
128 Gwinnett Cnty., 710 S.E.2d at 780.
129 GA. CONST. art. VIII, § V, ¶ 1 (“Authority is granted to county and area boards of
education to establish and maintain public schools within their limits . . . .”); see also Gwinnett
Cnty, 710 S.E.2d at 775–76 (discussing history of Georgia education clauses).
120
121
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why is the shape of the regulatory regime not like these obviously
unimportant features? This question can be answered, but the courts do
not even attempt to respond to it. For all the space the opinions give to
similarities between charters and public schools, they say nothing about
how they determine which features of a school makes it public. Here is
the peroration of the Ohio court’s opinion: “To achieve the goal of
improving and customizing public education programs, the General
Assembly has augmented the state’s public school system with public
community schools” (“community schools” being Ohio’s term for
charters). 130 Similarly, neither the Ohio nor the Georgia cases mention
private schools, apparently thinking them irrelevant. But they are very
relevant: if the critical legal fact is that charters and traditional public
schools are regulated similarly, then it is worth noting, at least, that
private schools are also regulated by the states, in many respects
similarly to the ways public schools are regulated. The Ohio and
Georgia courts ignore this.
Ultimately, the Georgia and Ohio supreme courts do not address
this question because for them it goes without saying. They know what a
public school is when they see it—and what they see is what everyone
means by “public school,” i.e., a Progressive school. This approach has
an originalist cast, in that the framers of twentieth-century education
clauses arguably constitutionalized Progressivism when they used the
terms “public” or “common school,” terms of art to Progressives. But at
base it is an ordinary-meaning claim: we still understand the terms as
the Progressives did and do, because that is the kind of public school
system that we have.
These cases therefore shed little light on the public/private question
in federal constitutional law. Not only does the education-clause context
place them in a state-law context without a federal analogue, 131 but the
interpretative roadmap that state courts offer in this area fails to engage
the issue at the heart of the federal question.
C.

Section 1983 Actions

Whether a particular school is public is sometimes relevant to tort
liability. Libel is one example. The federal district court in the district of
Minnesota barred a counterclaim alleging libel brought by a charter
school because libel claims cannot be raised by “public” entities. 132 The
case, without much analysis, held that the charter school was a public
Ohio Cong., 2006-Ohio-5512, ¶ 32, 857 N.E.2d at 1158–59.
See Saiger, School Choice and States’ Duty, supra note 94, at 925.
132 Am. Civil Liberties Union of Minn. v. Tarek Ibn Ziyad Acad., No. 09-138(DWF/JJG),
2009 WL 4823378, at *4 (D. Minn. Dec. 9, 2009).
130
131
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school largely because state law said it was a public school, and because
it “incorporated itself as such in order to be approved as a public charter
school under” the state chartering statute. 133 This language, and
language in similar cases, suggests that some courts understand
publicness as a question of state law, rather than one of federal law or of
fact; and moreover that they view state declarations that charters are
public as determinative of the state-law question. 134 Other cases simply
assume that charters are public schools, perhaps because the parties
failed to raise the issue and perhaps because courts found it obvious. 135
The Supreme Court addressed this question explicitly in the
important case of Rendell-Baker v. Kahn, decided in 1982. Rendell-Baker
involved a school organized, administered, and managed as a private
corporation to provide special education services and to serve youth
under the supervision of the criminal justice system. 136 The Court held
that such a school did not act “under color of state law” for the purpose
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 137 The Court reached this conclusion
notwithstanding that the school received between 90% and 99% of its
annual income from public authorities. 138 The Court categorically
rejected Justice Marshall’s suggestion that “[t]he fact that the school is
providing a substitute for public education is also an important
indicium of state action.” 139 Instead the Court viewed the private school
as a government contractor. 140 It enjoyed freedom of action 141 except to
the extent it chose to limit that freedom by contract. Its private nature
was confirmed precisely by its contractual relationship with a public
authority. 142 It is also worth noting that Justice Marshall himself, while
arguing that the school acted under color of state law, appeared to
harbor no doubts that it was a “private enterprise,” a “substitute for,”
rather than example of, public education. 143
Kimberly Yuracko relies in part on Rendell-Baker to argue that
homeschoolers are state actors, either under a “public function” theory
that attributes state action to “private actors [who] exercise
monopolistic control over a traditionally public function,” 144 or a
Id.
Cf. Hulden, supra note 106, at 1268–70 (collecting cases).
135 E.g., Porta v. Klagholz, 19 F. Supp. 2d 290, 298–300 (D.N.J. 1998); see also Hulden, supra
note 106, at 1268–69.
136 Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 832–33 (1982).
137 Id. at 843.
138 Id. at 832–33 & n.1.
139 Id. at 848 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
140 Id. at 843 (majority opinion).
141 Id. at 841.
142 Id. at 840–43.
143 Id. at 847–48 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
144 See Kimberly A. Yuracko, Education Off the Grid: Constitutional Constraints on
Homeschooling, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 123, 142–43 (2008).
133
134
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“delegation” theory which prevents governments from ducking
constitutional duties by “delegating . . . public functions to private
actors.” 145 But Rendell-Baker explicitly rejects such an argument with
respect to institutional, private schools. Private schooling predates
public schooling, and even in the heyday of Progressivism a robust
private school sector functioned in parallel with public schools. 146
Because education is not “traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the
state,” 147 private schools, even when their resources come nearly entirely
from public funds, do not provide a “public function” and thus become
public state actors. 148 The Ninth Circuit so reasoned when it determined
that charter schools were not necessarily state actors for employment
purposes. 149 The court stressed that “[u]nder § 1983, a state’s statutory
characterization of a private entity as a public actor for some purposes is
not necessarily dispositive with respect to all of that entity’s conduct.” 150
It also, moreover, concluded that state law’s contrary characterization of
charter schools as “public” was not “controlling.” 151
D.

Educating Children with Disabilities

Rendell-Baker is an interesting case because special education was,
until the advent of charter and voucher programs, the primary arena in
which the publicness and privateness of schools was an important
federal regulatory question. Rendell-Baker itself involved a state-law
program by which Massachusetts officials placed certain children in
private schools at state expense to provide them with “necessary special
education” services. This program is the Massachusetts counterpart to
the federal scheme enshrined in the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA). 152 The IDEA guarantees to all disabled children
(who live in states that choose to receive the associated federal funds) a
right to a “free, appropriate public education” (FAPE). 153 FAPE, the core
substantive right of the IDEA, is important to the state action question
because it requires that disabled children be provided with education
that is not only “free” but “public.”

Id. at 146, 149.
Id. at 145.
147 Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842.
148 But cf. Yuracko, supra note 144, at 146 (“Homeschooling parents” perform a “public
function” because they “exercise exclusive control over education . . . with respect to their own
children.”).
149 Caviness v. Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., Inc., 590 F.3d 806, 808 (9th Cir. 2010).
150 Id. at 814.
151 Id. at 813–14, 816.
152 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2006).
153 Id. § 1412(a)(1)(A).
145
146
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Nevertheless, the policy described in Rendell-Baker—placing
special education students in private facilities at public expense—has
been legislatively and judicially understood as a way to fulfill the FAPE
requirement since the passage of the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act, the predecessor of the IDEA. The statute, even as it
promulgated the FAPE requirement and its associated definitions
(which remain in force), 154 anticipated that states would “plac[e] or
refe[r]” handicapped children in “private schools and facilities . . . as the
means of carrying out [its] requirements.” 155 The recent 1997
amendments to the IDEA even more explicitly contemplate that private
placement is a permissible “means for carrying out the
requirements . . . requiring the provision of special education and
related services to all children with disabilities,” 156 which is the core
FAPE obligation. Public systems that fail to provide FAPE in their own
institutions can also be compelled by parents, both retrospectively and
prospectively, to pay tuition for appropriate private education in lieu of
public services. 157
This last guarantee was established and then expanded in a line of
Supreme Court cases that permitted parents to be reimbursed for
unilaterally placing their children in private schools if they could
subsequently demonstrate that the public schools would not have
provided FAPE. 158 On the face of the statute this is remarkable: state
failure to provide appropriate public education triggers an obligation to
provide private education. The most recent of these cases, which
broadened the scope of retroactive reimbursement for private school
tuitions to include parents whose children were never enrolled in a
public school, is particularly striking when it insists that without such
reimbursement, a “child’s right to a free appropriate
education . . . would be less than complete.” 159 This statement casually
elides the statute’s requirement that appropriate education also be
“public,” and its purported direct quotation of its own earlier precedent
simply omits the word “public” without even ellipsis. 160
What emerges from the statute, regulations, and case law is a
requirement to provide “public” education to disabled children that can
be and is routinely met by placement in “private” schools. Those private
schools do not thus become “public,” as Rendell-Baker attests; the IDEA
also calls them “private.” The requirement that the education provided
Id. §§ 1401(16), 1401(18), 1412(1) (1976).
Id. § 1413(a)(4)(B) (1976); accord S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 50 (1975).
156 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(B)(i) (2006).
157 Id. § 1412(a)(10)(B); 34 C.F.R. § 300.325 (2012).
158 See Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230 (2009); Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Dep’t
of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985).
159 See Forest Grove, 557 U.S at 244–45 (quoting Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369).
160 See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370.
154
155
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in those private schools be “public” is met, in the view of the Congress
and of the Court, primarily by ensuring that the costs of the private
education be paid for with public funds.
Standard principles of statutory interpretation urge that the phrase
“free, appropriate public education” be read to mean that “public”
education must be something beyond “free.” 161 This is buttressed by the
Act’s definition of FAPE as “special education and related services
that . . . have been provided” not only “at public expense . . . and without
charge” but also “under public supervision and direction.” 162 Further
reinforcing the notion that “public” should mean something beyond “at
no cost to parents” is the Act’s definition of “special education” as
“specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents.” 163 But Congress
did not intend, and neither Congress nor the courts have read, either
“public . . . education” nor “public supervision and direction” to mean
that public schools should provide the necessary services. All that is
required is that public authorities, if they choose to direct public funds
to private institutions, satisfy themselves that those private entities will
provide the appropriate services. 164 Special education is therefore
“public” if it is paid for by the public and if there is some level of public
regulation, whether by rule or by contract, ensuring that the state gets
what it pays for. It is a sort of “public” education that is routinely
delivered in “private” schools.
III. RELIGIOUS CHARTER SCHOOLS UNDER FIRST AMENDMENT
PRINCIPLES
Rather than asking whether charter schools are public schools in
the abstract, one should ask whether they are public schools or private
schools for the purpose of the relevant First Amendment rule that
161 Against this presumption is the Progressive practice of using the adjectives “free” and
“public,” along with other terms such as “thorough,” “general,” “‘uniform,” and “efficient,” as
synonyms for the Progressive, “common” school. See Saiger, School Choice and States’ Duty,
supra note 94, at 926. Many state constitutions deploy these adjectives in groups and it is not
clear that each is intended, or otherwise should, bear independent meaning. Id. at 925–26. But
while such a reading of the IDEA would permit the “free” and “public” components of FAPE to
bear overlapping meanings, those meanings would take on a Progressive cast inimical to the
practice of private special-education placements.
162 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(A).
163 Id. § 1401(29).
164 See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369. Prior to the 1997 amendments to the IDEA, the courts
suggested that the requirement that private entities provide “appropriate” services was based
not on the FAPE provision that education be “appropriate” as well as “free” and “public” but on
the legislative direction that, when FAPE was not provided, parents should be “grant[ed] such
relief as the court determines is appropriate.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1975) (emphasis added);
Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369. The 1997 amendments make it clearer that only a private placement
that provides appropriate education fulfills FAPE rights. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(B)(ii).
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private schools may engage in religious activities but public schools may
not. The answer to such a question must be found in the Supreme Court
cases that announce that public schools must be secular and in the
policies that underlie those cases. This Part analyzes these sources and
concludes that, for First Amendment purposes, charter schools are
private schools, and can therefore engage in religious activities much as
other private schools do.
The Part proceeds in the following way. Its first Section analyzes
Establishment Clause case law, emphasizing Zelman v. SimmonsHarris, 165 to conclude that charters are First Amendment private schools
that may engage in religious activity. Its second Section concludes that
the current structure of charter school funding, in which states subsidize
charters based upon their enrollment, is no obstacle to such activity.
This is so notwithstanding the problematic case of Mitchell v. Helms. 166
A final Section develops an important caveat to this conclusion: states
are obligated to guarantee a free, secular education to all children who
want one, even if demand for secular schooling is insufficient to
generate the necessary seats in an unregulated market.
A.

Charter Schools Are Private Schools for First Amendment Purposes

The previous Part suggests that no single definition of “public
school” directly applies to the hybrid form of the charter. Instead, the
meaning of “public school” for religion clause purposes depends upon
“the particular . . . context of public elementary and secondary
schools” 167 and of the clauses. Schools are not public or private, for
religion-clause purposes, because they are so labeled by legislatures or
others; 168 federal constitutional criteria control the determination. The
cases demonstrate that in the First Amendment context, a school is a
public state actor if its services are publicly provided, in the sense that
their instructional and policymaking staff are not only remunerated by
the government but subject to its direct-line authority. 169 They must be
government agents, not just contractors. In light of these cases,
especially Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 170 I conclude that, for religionclause purposes, charter schools are private schools and not state actors.

536 U.S. 639 (2002).
530 U.S. 793 (2000).
167 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585 (1987).
168 See Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
169 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 226, 230 (1997) (Thomas, J.) (plurality opinion)
(quoting Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993)). The Agostini opinion is
quoted in Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 809.
170 536 U.S. 639.
165
166
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The foundational case of Engel v. Vitale, holding that “it is no part
of the business of government to compose official prayers for any group
of the American people to recite as a part of a religious program carried
on by government,” 171 says nothing about what makes a public school
public. Neither does Abington School District v. Schempp, which a year
later prohibited public schools from beginning the school day with Bible
readings. 172 These and successor cases proceed without even a gesture
towards defining the key term “public school” because the Abington
Senior High School, like the Union Free School District No. 9 (in Engel),
the Nathan Bishop Middle School (in Lee v. Weisman), 173 and the
legions of other public schools that populate the Court’s cases each was
obviously, quintessentially, a public school. Everyone understood what a
public school was; there was no potential for confusion.
These cases nevertheless make clear, to use the language of Engel,
that the First Amendment is violated when government officials do the
“compos[ing]” and the “carr[ying] on.” 174 Similarly, Abington School
District emphasized that the Bible readings were unconstitutional
because they were “held in the school buildings under the supervision
and with the participation of teachers employed in those schools.” 175
Later cases make the same point, that religious activity in public schools
is forbidden because “[s]tate officials direct” that activity. 176 The core
problem identified by the case law is government employees and/or
government facilities directing religious instruction or practice.
This proposition becomes explicit in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,
which upheld a program in which the state of Ohio offered vouchers to
Cleveland parents that could be redeemed at participating private
schools. 177 Schools’ variable willingness to participate and parents’
choices combined to lead nearly all vouchers to be cashed at religious
schools. 178 The Supreme Court found that the program was nevertheless
constitutional because it was “neutral in all respects toward religion.” 179
Government aid reached religious schools only as a result of the
“genuine and independent choices of private individuals.” 180
Zelman is notable as the only Supreme Court opinion that
explicitly considers the quasi-market that results from parents’ ability to
select among three kinds of schools: traditional public schools,
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180

Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962).
374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963).
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586 (1992).
Engel, 370 U.S. at 425.
Abington Sch. Dist., 374 U.S. at 223.
Weisman, 505 U.S. at 577.
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
Id. at 647.
Id. at 653.
Id. at 649.
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traditional private schools, and charter schools. (As noted, Ohio calls its
charters “community schools.”) The Justices’ several opinions debate at
length whether and how the presence of the community schools on the
menu available to Cleveland parents should affect the outcome of the
case. For the Zelman majority, Ohio invited parents to exercise choice
across both “community school” and voucher options in addition to
traditional public schools. 181 Charter schools and the voucher program
were together part of “a broader undertaking by the State to enhance the
educational options of Cleveland’s schoolchildren” through choice. 182
The presence of the community schools, all secular, in the mix was
evidence that the voucher program did not “skew” parents’ choices
towards religious options. 183 The dissenters, by contrast, viewed the
question of whether the voucher program presented parents with a
“genuine and independent” 184 choice between religion and irreligion
only in terms of whether the set of participating private schools included
both religious and secular institutions. 185
The Court’s opinion in Zelman, apparently purposefully,
repeatedly avoids stating whether the community schools are “public”
or “private.” In introducing them, it says merely that they “are funded
under state law but are run by their own school boards, not by local
school districts.” 186 The opinion goes on (accurately) to note that the
schools at issue in the case exist along a spectrum that ranges from
public to private: “Parents that choose to participate in the scholarship
program and then to enroll their children in a private school (religious
or nonreligious) must copay a portion of the school’s tuition. Families
that choose a community school, magnet school, or traditional public
school pay nothing.” 187 No label is attached to the charters.
The separate opinions in the case are more willing to categorize
charters in order to advance their arguments. Justice Thomas calls
Ohio’s charters “privately run community schools.” 188 Justice Souter,
writing for four dissenters, calls them “community public schools.” 189
But Souter expresses some doubt about his conclusion: “To be fair,
community schools do exhibit some features of private schools: they are
autonomously managed without any interference from the school
district or State.” 190 “[I]n substance,” he writes, community schools are
Id. at 659.
Id. at 647.
183 Id. at 653–54 (quoting Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487–
88 (1986)).
184 Id. at 649.
185 Id. at 699 (Souter, J., dissenting).
186 Id. at 647 (majority opinion).
187 Id. at 654.
188 Id. at 681 (Thomas, J., concurring).
189 Id. at 699 (Souter, J., dissenting).
190 Id. at 701 n.9.
181
182
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“merely private schools with state funding.” 191 Souter’s objection to the
majority’s reasoning (in this section of his lengthy dissent) is not so
much that it miscategorizes community schools as that its reasoning
about the range of choice includes “any public school” that is
“nontraditional.” 192
Souter’s admission that charters are “in substance merely private
schools” is telling. 193 Indeed, the standard charter regime—in which
parents may opt to send their children to a particular charter, in which
case a public subsidy is directed or redirected to that school—is
isomorphic with the voucher program the Court blesses in Zelman.
Private parties manage and make decisions for both charter schools and
voucher-receiving schools. In both cases, schools’ eligibility to receive a
per-student subsidy depends both upon their compliance with
government requirements and parental decisions: only if they can get
families to enroll their children do they receive funds. Also, in neither
case do parents receive cash. The actual transfer of funds, triggered by
parental choice, is direct from government to school.
Charter schools and Zelman’s voucher schools do differ, but not in
ways significant for First Amendment purposes. It obviously does not
matter, for example, that schools must apply for charters while private
schools can cash vouchers if they meet eligibility requirements and then
elect to participate. Nor, I argue, do two more significant differences—
the scope of public regulatory control and the charging of tuition—
provide a basis for distinction.
Charters are often claimed to be more similar to public than to
private schools because charters are very heavily regulated. In addition
to requirements regarding collective bargaining (in some states) and
admissions (in all), states often require charters to cover a set
curriculum, to provide special education, and to keep various kinds of
records. 194 Charters are subject to requirements, sometimes strenuous,
governing reporting of academic and other data and to assessment and
re-assessment by their chartering authority. 195 Such heavy regulation, as
noted above, was pivotal to the determination by some state courts that
charter schools are public schools. 196
This position is ironic for two reasons. First, the sine qua non of
the charter system is that charters can “operate with much less oversight

Id.
Id. Although Justice Stevens joined Souter’s dissent, Stevens’s own separate opinion,
joined by none of his colleagues, insists that community schools are a species of public schools.
Id. at 685 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
193 Id. at 701 n.9 (Souter, J., dissenting).
194 See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text.
195 See Sugarman & Kuboyama, supra note 49, at 920.
196 See supra Part II.A.
191
192
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and regulation than traditional public schools.” 197 The whole concept is
that market accountability substitutes for close regulation. 198 Second,
traditional private schools are also subject to substantial regulation. 199
Many states impose obligations upon them with respect to curriculum,
testing, record-keeping, and teacher qualifications. True, the state
cannot restrict, except in particular ways, the choices they make about
supplementing that curriculum, but neither do states restrict charters in
this way. Private school teachers can be subject to state requirements for
accreditation and to state labor law (although, the Supreme Court
recently affirmed, the latter is subject to a “ministerial exception”). 200
Indeed, in Zelman itself, the religious private schools participating in the
voucher program were subjected not only to the regulatory regime
governing all private schools, 201 but also to additional requirements
size, 203
curriculum, 204
and
regarding
nondiscrimination, 202
205
transparency. These similarities were brought to the Court’s attention.
There are areas with respect to which the regulatory regimes
governing private schools and charters differ. Charters, but not private
schools, must admit all applicants or use a lottery should the number of
applications exceed the number of places. 206 Nor must private schools
reach target levels of academic achievement, 207 or submit to regular
inspections from state officials, as charters are often required to do. 208
But each of these is an obligation detailed in the school’s charter, which
is no more than a contract between the chartering authority and the
school. 209 That chartering authorities seek a particular set of contract
terms does not change the character of the charter as a public/private
agreement. Moreover, private schools do face some analogous
requirements. Floors for academic achievement and periodic
monitoring are features of private-school accreditation. 210 With respect
to student admissions, the voucher schools of Zelman were also

197 Amy Stuart Wells et al., Charter Schools as Postmodern Paradox: Rethinking Social
Stratification in an Age of Deregulated School Choice, 69 HARV. EDUC. REV. 172, 174 (1999).
198 See id.
199 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 91, at 179.
200 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 707–08
(2012).
201 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.976(A)(3) (West 2012).
202 Id. § 3313.976(A)(4).
203 Id. § 3313.976(A)(5).
204 Id. § 3313.976(A)(6).
205 Id. § 3313.976(A)(7).
206 See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text.
207 See Sugarman & Kuboyama, supra note 49, at 901–02, 919, 921.
208 See id. at 920.
209 See FINN, MANNO & VANOUREK, supra note 52, at 15.
210 See Sugarman & Kuboyama, supra note 49, at 878.
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subjected to a regime of open admissions and lotteries for
oversubscribed seats, but did not become public thereby. 211
The differences between charter and private school regulation, in
short, are differences only of degree, and not in kind. Professor O’Neil
imagines that a charter school insufficiently coupled to public authority
by regulation would not be a charter school: “It might well partake some
of the qualities of a charter school but would be in fact (whatever the
terminology) a state-licensed, state-regulated, and possibly state-funded
private school.” 212 I cannot discern where on the spectrum of regulation,
from private schools to private schools receiving vouchers to charters to
traditional publics, O’Neil’s red line is to be drawn.
Charters also differ from private schools, and are similar to
traditional public schools, because they charge no tuition. 213 Private
schools, on the other hand, charge some or all of their students. The
Zelman voucher required a parental copayment to the school. 214 But the
Supreme Court, in its tax-credit cases, 215 its special education cases, 216
and especially in Zelman, has made it abundantly clear that private
schools that accept state vouchers remain private schools. This is true
even if the private schools use the vouchers as their primary source of
support for the voucher-bearing student’s education, imposing only
minimal additional private charges on the family. 217 Moreover, charter
schools also have access to some kinds of private monies, such as
philanthropy, grants, and, in the case of for-profit charters, investment
capital. 218 The income stream enjoyed by a regulated and subsidized
private school again differs only in degree, not in kind, from that
enjoyed by a charter school.
Private management, however, does constitute a difference in kind.
As James Ryan has argued, “it must be the combination of government
funding and government oversight that makes a school public.” 219 And
if, as I have argued, even close regulation is insufficient to constitute the
necessary kind of oversight, then it must be public control, not public
subsidy, that defines “public” in contradistinction to private schools.
211 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.977(A)(1)(d) (West 2012) (providing for admission to
voucher-accepting schools “from among such applicants by lot,” subject only to preferences for
previously enrolled students, siblings of previously enrolled students, and students of low
income).
212 O’Neil, supra note 100, at 221.
213 See Sugarman & Kuboyama, supra note 49, at 873.
214 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 646 (2002).
215 See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
216 See supra Part II.D.
217 Ohio limited the copayment that Cleveland private schools could impose upon voucher
families. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 646.
218 See, e.g., Caviness v. Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., Inc., 590 F.3d 806, 809 (9th Cir. 2010)
(noting this fact in the context of a § 1983 analysis).
219 Ryan, supra note 90, at 407–08.
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Public control means line control, where every policy action by the
school is ultimately subject, through bureaucratic hierarchy, to local
voters. In this sense, charter schools decisions are clearly not public. To
be sure, the scope of their potential decisions is limited by the state, but
in exactly the same sense as any private actor in a regulated industry
contracting with the government has its discretion limited. A charter
must abide by relevant regulation, and may choose to accept above
those requirements the terms of any government contract, but within
the envelope established by these the charter is free to act as it will.
This reading offers a significant rehabilitation of Zelman. Where
most authors in the aftermath of Zelman dismiss it on the grounds of
vouchers’ negligible political purchase, 220 Zelman’s reach extends to the
galloping proliferation of charter schools. It stands for the proposition
that the bulk of Supreme Court jurisprudence about religion and public
schools does not apply to neoliberal educational regimes. Charter
schools are so similar to the voucher-accepting schools of Zelman that it
is difficult to posit any plausible argument asserting that they are, as
schools, different. Therefore, just as the private schools in Zelman could
teach and practice religion, even while supported by publicly funded
vouchers, because that funding was provided them only to the extent
that they were freely chosen by parents—so too charters embedded in
such a program of parental choice can freely teach and practice religion.
B.

Charter Funding Is No Obstacle to Charters’ Religious Activities in a
Neoliberal Framework

Prior to Zelman, a case concerning loans by the State of Louisiana
to parochial schools of “instructional and educational materials” badly
fractured the Supreme Court. 221 The controlling separate opinion in the
case, 222 written by Justice O’Connor and joined by Justice Breyer,
distinguished “direct” and “indirect” government aid to religious
schools. O’Connor and Breyer agreed with four other Justices that
“indirect” aid, mediated by private choice like scholarship 223 or
voucher 224 programs, is constitutional if the program is neutral with
respect to religion. 225 But, O’Connor wrote in Mitchell v. Helms, direct
See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text.
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 802 (2000) (Thomas, J.) (plurality opinion) (quoting 20
U.S.C. § 7351(b)(2) (2000)).
222 For the controlling nature of O’Connor’s opinion, see Steven K. Green, The
Constitutionality of Vouchers After Mitchell v. Helms, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. LAW 57, 63
(2000) [hereinafter Green, The Constitutionality of Vouchers]; Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle,
The Faith-Based Initiative and the Constitution, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 75 (2005).
223 See Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
224 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
225 See Tushnet, supra note 95, at 7–8.
220
221
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aid requires additional guarantees that it not be used for or diverted to
religious purposes. 226 Zelman, moreover, preserved the direct/indirect
distinction. 227
State aid to charter schools does appear to be “direct” aid as
O’Connor understands it. At one time the Supreme Court used the term
“direct aid” to encompass not only any “cash paymen[t]” but any
“substantial” subsidy to a religious school. 228 “Indirect aid” meant only
those subsidies that met the Lemon-era requirement that they not have
the “primary effect” of advancing religion. 229 But O’Connor, who
approves of indirect cash payments, repurposes the term “direct” to
mean state payments made to religious schools without the mediation of
a private party, such as a student or a family. 230 Indirect payments (not
necessarily cash) must be placed in the hands of a private person who
then redirects it to the school. 231 O’Connor is explicit that payments
remain direct if they are per-capita aid based upon enrollment, even if
enrollment is a private choice, so long as payment flows directly from
state to school. 232 This is precisely the structure of state aid to charter
schools.
Nonetheless, for several reasons Justice O’Connor’s Mitchell
opinion should not be understood to prevent charter schools from
simultaneously engaging in religious activity and receiving state aid.
First, its distinction between direct and indirect aid is extraordinarily
formalist, verging on the incoherent. 233 A scheme under which aid flows
“directly” to a school on a per-capita basis, but where the number of
heads for which aid is provided is entirely dependent on students’ “free
and independent” enrollment decisions, is in no meaningful way
different from indirect aid. 234 In both, private choices are the sole
determinant of whether and how much public monies schools receive. 235
See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 222, at 75.
See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 649 (“[O]ur decisions have drawn a consistent distinction
between government programs that provide aid directly to religious schools and programs of
true private choice . . . .” (citations omitted)).
228 Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 393–94 (1985); see also Steven K. Green,
Private School Vouchers and the Confusion over “Direct” Aid, 10 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 47,
74–75 (1999–2000).
229 See Ball, 473 U.S. at 393.
230 Cf. Green, The Constitutionality of Vouchers, supra note 222, at 71 (stating that it is
“unclear” whether Justice O’Connor rejects the usages in Ball in favor of pure formalism).
231 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 841–42 (2000) (O’Connor, J.) (concurring in judgment);
Richard W. Garnett, The Story of Henry Adams’s Soul: Education and the Expression of
Associations, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1841, 1867–68 (2001).
232 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 842 (O’Connor, J.) (concurring in judgment).
233 See Michael J. Frank, The Evolving Establishment Clause Jurisprudence and School
Vouchers, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 997, 1052–53 (2002).
234 See Jesse H. Choper, The Endorsement Test: Its Status and Desirability, 18 J.L. & POL. 499,
512 n.76 (2002) (“[This] distinction strikes me as amounting to form over substance.”).
235 See Frank, supra note 233, at 1053–54.
226
227
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It is not as if the vouchers in Zelman or the scholarship in Witters
involved actual cash given to private parties, who then elected whether
to send it on to the school in which they enrolled; the programs
involved paperwork, not tender. This makes it quite difficult to
understand O’Connor’s claim that “when the government provides aid
directly to the student beneficiary, that student can attend a religious
school and yet retain control over whether the secular government aid
will be applied toward the religious education.” 236 A parent who enrolls
a student in a charter school, and by doing so directs one unit of state
per capita aid to that school, is isomorphic to a parent who endorses a
voucher chit over to a private school, which school on that basis then
receives a state check.
Such empty formalism is good reason to ignore O’Connor’s
direct/indirect distinction, particularly after Zelman. That same
emptiness, in any event, offers states straightforward work-arounds.
States could easily add to forms parents use to enroll their children in
charter schools a statement to the effect, “With this election I direct the
$x in state aid to which my child is entitled to the charter I have selected
above.” This change in wording would transform charter funding into
the sort of “indirect” program that Mitchell does not bar, and which five
Justices (including O’Connor) blessed in Zelman. If formalism is to
carry the day, it can be accommodated easily.
O’Connor’s strongest argument in favor of formalism is that direct
aid sends a stronger “message of [religious] endorsement” than indirect
aid. 237 A virtue of indirect, mediated aid, she suggests, is that reasonable
observers will understand its use for religious purposes to result from
private rather than public decision. This will not be as clear in the case
of direct, per-capita aid. 238 And endorsement has been a dominant
concern regarding religion and schools since Engel v. Vitale, the
foundational case that outlawed prayer in public schools. 239 Engel makes
resounding pronouncements that a prayer conducted by a “civil
magistrate” 240 pursuant to “officia[l] prescri[ption]” 241 is an illegitimate
“union of government and religion.” 242
But consider a charter school whose principal decided to begin the
day with a prayer, whether “nondenominational” like the one in Engel
or unapologetically sectarian. That prayer is not “official” in the way
that its counterpart was in Engel. Its text would be set not by a “civil
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 842 (O’Connor, J.) (concurring in judgment).
Id. at 842–43.
238 See Garnett, supra note 231, at 1869; Steven G. Gey, Reconciling The Supreme Court’s
Four Establishment Clauses, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 725, 752 (2006).
239 See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
240 Id. at 432.
241 Id. at 433.
242 Id. at 431.
236
237
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magistrate” 243 but by a private party, avoiding government involvement
in the “compos[ition] [of] official prayers.” 244 The setting and timing of
the prayers would similarly not be determined by government. The
prayers moreover would be heard only by students whose families had
affirmatively elected for them to be present. So long as no state statute
required, urged, or invited charters to undertake prayer, almost none of
the reasoning of Engel is apropos to such a scenario. Prayer in freely
chosen charter schools is therefore far from embodying the “official
prescription” that Engel rejects. Rather, it instantiates the alternative
approach to prayer that Engel celebrates: “[G]overnment in this country
should stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning official prayers
and leave that purely religious function to the people themselves and to
those the people choose to look to for religious guidance.” 245
The precise concern of Mitchell is that the funding of such schools,
rather than their practices per se, might constitute impermissible
endorsement. Justice O’Connor long urged the partial displacement of
Lemon in favor of a focus upon whether government is “conveying or
attempting to convey a message that religion or a particular religious
belief is favored or preferred.” 246 O’Connor’s question should be asked
with respect to an “objective observer” who is acquainted with both “the
text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute” at issue and
“with the Free Exercise Clause and the values it promotes.” 247 On the
other hand, O’Connor’s formulation of the endorsement test requires
that the religious message cannot be perceived under the statute “as
drafted or as actually implemented.” 248 Neoliberal plans that allowed
religious chartering could have the effect of increasing the availability of
religious options for students, sometimes dramatically so.
What O’Connor’s objective observer would understand when faced
with religious charters depends heavily upon the frame the observer
deploys. Even absent a formalist work-around, such an observer would
not be able to perceive endorsement based on the theory of charters,
which is that a thousand flowers should bloom. Some charters will
incorporate prayer into their school day, and various charters will
choose prayers of various types; but other charters will not pray at all,
and devote themselves instead to meditation, or microbiology, or mime.
Seeing that the government had opened the field to a cornucopia of
approaches, religious and nonreligious, O’Connor’s observer could
hardly conclude that the state was endorsing any, including the religious
243
244
245
246
247
248

Id. at 432.
Id. at 425.
Id. at 435 (emphasis added).
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
Id. at 76, 83.
Id. at 73 (emphasis added).
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ones. This is quite different than the situation the same observer faced in
Mitchell, where most of the schools receiving the aid at issue were
religious. 249
Such an observer would not be confused by the practice of
referring to charters as “public” into thinking that charters actually are
public, in the traditional sense, because she would be paying attention to
the legislative history of chartering and would understand this to be a
misleading, if politically helpful, device. 250 Nor would the observer be
swayed into inferring from the fact of government funding, generous
and on a per-pupil basis, and in most cases the overwhelming if not
exclusive source of funds for the charter, either the reality or the
impression that the charter is the state. Not only is this conclusion
foreclosed by Zelman, but the thrust of the neoliberal turn is to place
decisions in the hands of a market, albeit a subsidized one. The observer
would understand that charter schools seek to satisfy their students, not
the state.
On the other hand, if the objective observer framed the funding of
religious charters as an incremental change to prior funding schemes,
she might well perceive endorsement, particular as the transition is
“actually implemented.” 251 Given that the requirement of strict
secularism is among the greatest sources of discontent with American
public schooling for a large segment of the public, 252 a predominant
effect of relaxing that restriction could well be to increase religious
options. This is true a fortiori if there is a transition from current state
law regimes, which allow charters but require them to be secular, to a
regime that drops the secularism requirement in favor of a lesser
requirement that sufficient secular seats be available in a school
system. 253 While under the theoretical frame this is merely an opening
up or a deregulation of the market, the transitional frame makes it look
like the state is having the effect (holding intent aside) of facilitating
religion.
It seems clear that the former frame is correct. The transitional
frame would introduce a very strong small-“c” conservative bias into
endorsement analysis: things that would have been allowed are
forbidden because they were not done sooner. Moreover, transitional
concerns can be expected to dissipate. As neoliberalism takes hold in
American educational culture, more individuals, including ordinary
parents, students, and citizens—and surely the attentive, informed
observers among them—will increasingly understand that whatever
249
250
251
252
253

Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 803 (2000) (Thomas, J.) (plurality opinion).
See supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 73 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
See infra Part V.
See infra Part III.C.
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religious content exists as part of a system of choice is attributable to
private, not state, preferences.
And there can be no doubt that charter schools, and charter-school
aid, are neutral. Some have claimed that voucher programs are sub rosa
efforts to direct state funding to religious schools, even as they are
officially justified in secular terms. 254 These arguments, although
rejected by the courts, can be made in good faith. In contrast,
notwithstanding occasional blunderbuss to the contrary, 255 there should
be no dispute that charter schools were introduced and allowed to
proliferate to achieve the secular goal of improving educational
outcomes and expanding the range of educational choices available to
parents. 256 This is much clearer in the charter case than it was in Lemon,
where a secular purpose was found for policies that authorized state
payments to secular teachers in private (including religious) schools. 257
Indeed, as I discuss in Part IV, charters today are implemented pursuant
to statutes that forbid them to engage in religious exercise.
Because many states as a matter of positive law prohibit religious
activity in charter schools, 258 it might be possible to argue that charter
statutes would fail to meet the requirement that government programs
“must have a secular legislative purpose” 259 were these prohibitions to be
amended, or omitted in a new statute otherwise cognate with statutes in
other states. But this narrow a view of “secular purpose” is deeply
inconsistent with the case law. 260 Justice Thomas has, with substantial
support on the Court, urged neutrality as the proper interpretation of
the secular purpose test. For Thomas, a statute is constitutional “if the
government, seeking to further some legitimate secular purpose, offers
aid on the same terms, without regard to religion, to all who adequately
further that purpose.” 261 This is precisely what is offered by a chartering
scheme that is silent as to religion or even explicitly provides that
religious and nonreligious schools may be chartered on the same basis.
More sweeping accounts of secular purpose in this instance yield similar
conclusions. As Kent Greenawalt argues, a valid law must have “either a
secular purpose (that is not only the remote objective of a more direct
purpose to promote religion) or a purpose to accommodate religion in a
permissible way.” 262 It is untenable to argue that allowing religious and
See supra note 41.
Minow, Seduction of Choice, supra note 34, at 839 & n.103.
256 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 9-101(b) (West 2013).
257 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
258 See infra Part IV.A.
259 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13.
260 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 807–08 (2000) (Thomas, J.) (plurality opinion)
(stating that the Court has “modified” and “recast” the secular purpose test of Lemon).
261 Id. at 810.
262 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 91, at 162.
254
255
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nonreligious organizations to charter schools on the same basis is
intended to promote religion under such a definition. A policy of
enriching the totality of educational options, pursued for a decade
without religious participation, is neutral with respect to religion. 263
One final reason not to allow Mitchell to block even “direct” aid to
religious charter schools is that, though technically still good law, it no
longer commands support on the Supreme Court. O’Connor’s Mitchell
opinion is a quintessential expression of her long-held place as a swing
voter situated between two four-Justice blocs. It seems very unlikely that
Justice Samuel Alito, who replaced Justice O’Connor, shares her
idiosyncratic view of Establishment, 264 and quite likely that he would be
sympathetic to the view of the four-Justice plurality in Mitchell that
would have held that any program of direct aid is constitutional if
neutral as to religion. 265
The first two Sections of this Part demonstrate that charter schools,
although described by state legislatures, politicians, academic
commentators, and some Justices as “public schools,” are allowed to do
things that our legal culture has insisted for decades that public schools
may not do. It is constitutional for charters to begin their day with
formal prayer, publicly read the Bible, and teach children that religious
propositions are true or false. A fortiori, charters constitutionally can
also engage in the various marginal activities that have occupied the
Supreme Court since the seventies with respect to public schools—
observing moments of silence, 266 praying at school football games 267 and
graduations, 268 and (perhaps) teaching “creation science.” 269 So long as
charter statutes and funding policies of the state neither intend, direct,
encourage, nor discourage the content of charters’ decisions about
religious practice or teaching, Supreme Court cases regarding religious
activity in public schools do not apply to charters.
C.

Secular Schools Must Be Available to All Comers

The Zelman Court took the position that its opinion was not a
major change in course, but simply the straightforward, easy extension
of an “unbroken line of decisions rejecting challenges to similar
263 Cf. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653 (2002) (stating that the voucher
program is “neutral in all respects toward religion”).
264 See Nelson Tebbe, Excluding Religion, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1263, 1286 (2008).
265 See Tushnet, supra note 95, at 7–8.
266 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
267 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
268 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586 (1992).
269 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987). I leave open the question whether states can
neutrally regulate the teaching of the life sciences to exclude pseudo-scientific theorizing.
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programs.” 270 This view suggests that the opinion might not apply were
its subject not a voucher experiment but a pervasive and full-blown
charter sector. We know only a little about how a market equilibrium
might look in such a world. 271 One possibility is particularly important:
that the sum of individual preferences in a local quasi-marketplace for
charters might yield a system where all government-subsidized schools
were religious. This does not seem likely; but neither, given the uneven
geographical distribution of religious commitments across the country,
does it seem fanciful.
This possibility raises the specter of impermissible religious
coercion and unconstitutional primary effects. Potential responses to
that coercion, in which the government acts to ensure that secular
education is available, also raise the possibility of impermissible
entanglement. This Section considers these issues and concludes that
states must subsidize, sponsor, or otherwise manage the school systems
they fund so as to guarantee a free education in a fully secular setting to
every child who wants one. However, states need not guarantee that
every educational choice with religious content offered by a choicebased system also be offered in a religion-free version.
1.

Coercion

Compulsory schooling is intrinsically coercive. State insistence that
every child attend school cannot cloak a demand that any child engage
in religious exercise. This has been important in the Court’s cases at
least since Abington School District v. Schempp. 272 Indeed, some cases
indentify coercion as the key reason that the Court insists upon
secularism in public schools:
Families entrust public schools with the education of their children,
but condition their trust on the understanding that the classroom
will not purposely be used to advance religious views that may
conflict with the private beliefs of the student and his or her
family. . . . The State exerts great authority and coercive power
through mandatory attendance requirements, and because of the
students’ emulation of teachers as role models and the children’s
susceptibility to peer pressure. 273

270 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662–63 (2002). Contra id. at 687–88 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the majority opinion “ignor[es]” or even “repudiate[s]” existing case
law).
271 See Tushnet, supra note 95, at 11; supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text.
272 374 U.S. 203, 224–25 (1963).
273 Edwards, 482 U.S. at 584.

SAIGER.34.4 (Do Not Delete)

1204

4/19/2013 12:06 PM

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:1163

The Court, moreover, has been generous in its appreciation of the
potential forms coercion can take and skeptical that opting out can cure
coerciveness. Students required to be in school but officially invited to
stand by passively or even to absent themselves during a religious
exercise are still, in the view of the Court, coerced. 274 Beyond such
formal in-school activities that create “indirect coercive pressure upon
religious minorities to conform,” 275 the Court has deemed unlawful the
inclusion of religious elements in genuinely optional school-related
events. In Lee v. Weisman the Court held that official prayer at a public
school “formal graduation ceremon[y]” was inconsistent with the First
Amendment, 276 even though students were not required to be present. 277
In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, the Court similarly
struck down a policy that allowed students collectively to agree to
prayers at varsity football games and then elect a peer representative to
deliver them. 278 “[R]each[ing] past formalism,” 279 these cases insist that
to bundle religion with an activity that elicits in students a “genuine
desire” to participate, or with respect to which they face “immense social
pressure” from peers, is sufficient to constitute coercion. 280
The Court’s coercion doctrine therefore clearly requires every state
that makes schooling compulsory to guarantee a secular education to
every student who wants one. Under Weisman and Santa Fe, this option
must be offered at the school, not the programmatic, level. It is
insufficient to allow students to opt out of religious activities that a
charter school conducts, lest they feel coerced to participate
nevertheless. There must be enough seats in fully secular schools—
schools free from religion “root and branch”—to accommodate as many
children who want them.
The most straightforward way to ensure this, aside from
prohibiting religious school choice altogether, is to continue to operate
traditional public schools, available to all comers, alongside charters.
Such schools, because they are government-run as well as governmentfunded, perforce satisfy the requirement that secular schools be
available. This is of course what every American jurisdiction now does.
Although this practice is likely to persist indefinitely, going forward an
all-charter system could arise, as developments in post-Katrina New
Orleans suggest. 281 In such a system the state would still have to
guarantee sufficient secular seats for all takers. If necessary, it would
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281

Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962).
Id.
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 580 (1992).
Id. at 586, 593.
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 297–98 (2000).
Id. at 311 (quoting Weisman, 505 U.S. at 595).
Id. at 311–12 (quoting Weisman, 505 U.S. at 595, 593).
See Garda, supra note 61; supra text accompanying note 61.
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have to meddle with the market mechanism, using subsidies,
preferences in the chartering process, or other tools. Even in heavily
religious areas, this should be feasible.
The harder question is whether a system in which many but not all
options available to children are religious can still be coercive even if
there are enough seats in secular schools for all who desire them. In
other words, is running traditional public schools alongside charters
always sufficient to avoid unconstitutional coercion? In the alternative,
were a hypothetical locality to abandon traditional public schooling in
favor of an all-charter system, would it be constitutionally sufficient to
offer to each student who requests secular schooling some seat in some
secular charter school, or would more be required?
The difficulty arises because each charter school with a religious
component combines secular and religious elements. A spectrum of
possible cases can be identified. At one end is a system in which every
available charter that involves religious practice is twinned with a
cognate school option materially identical in all respects except for
being secular. At the (imaginary) extreme, materiality extends to all
relevant characteristics of the school: academic program, but also
disciplinary policy, culture, racial and economic characteristics of
students and teachers, size, location, and so on. Such a system is clearly
not religiously coercive. At the other end of the spectrum is a locality
where the operation of a genuine quasi-market generates only religious
schools. Doubtless in such circumstances the state must supplement
such a market with a single secular alternative, just as it would have to
do if most students in the district attended private religious schools. The
question the latter possibility raises is whether public funding of the
religious charters imposes additional duties upon the state beyond
funding that one alternative. Is it unconstitutionally coercive for the
state to present students with a binary choice between Execrable Public
High and the Excellent Preparatory Academy when Excellent includes
religious practice, making Execrable the only secular option?
In between these extremes are a range of more realistic possibilities.
The traditional public school could be far from execrable, but still
dissimilar to various religious charter options. Consider a hypothetical
charter school that focuses, for example, on both evangelism and
environmental science. 282 Would this particular bundling of sacred and
secular lead a student passionate about the environment to feel
unconstitutionally “coerced” to accept (or to urge her parents to accept)
some evangelism in order to pursue environmentalism, just as a student
passionate about football might elect to endure an uncongenial prayer?
Such potential coercion is not cured by the availability of a seat in
282

For examples of charter school themes, see infra note 352.
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perfectly adequate traditional, but not environmentally-focused, public
school. Similarly, a student who thrives in intimate surroundings might
trade away her secular preference in order to escape Enormous Central
High. Such students might be “coerced” even if they make the trade
willingly. Coercion could occur, moreover, even if multiple secular
options were generated by the quasi-market. The existence of a secular
charter that emphasizes fine arts and another that focuses on French
might leave our environmentally oriented but irreligious student still
willing (or tempted) to swallow some evangelism to get environmental
studies.
It must be noted, moreover, that the “twinned” system cannot be
realized. It seems fanciful as a practical matter, surely beyond the
capacity of any school district. Indeed, it is fanciful in principle. Every
school is different. Also, one reason that some religious private schools
have the secular features they have is because they are part of a religious
community; the religious principles that guide all the school’s activities
shape its secular elements. These include both curricular approaches,
like strategies for teaching reading or mathematics, and issues like
discipline, grading, teachers’ authority, and feeling of community that
constitute a school’s culture. 283 Many religious educators’ work in these
areas in today’s private schools is explicitly, purposefully, and inherently
religious. A rule that no government-subsidized bundle can include
religion without the availability of an equivalent nonreligious bundle is a
rule that no bundle can include religion.
Some of the Court’s dicta nevertheless suggest that anything short
of the “twinned” system might be unconstitutionally coercive. Choosing
a school imposes a more “difficult choice” than forgoing a football
game. 284 Team sports are “decidedly extracurricular,” unlike the choice
of a school. 285 Similar or greater “informal pressure” and “genuine
desire[s]” might arise in connection with choosing a school than with
attending graduation. 286 If all that is necessary to “coerce” adolescents is
for there to be some school program that poses a “difficult choice” or
conflicts with a “genuine desire,” then our environmentally minded
student would be coerced by the religious environmental charter
regardless of her other options, unless one of those options is an
otherwise similar secular environmental charter. Our small-school
student would be coerced by the small charter absent a small secular
high school.
Other decisions suggest a different approach. The most striking is
Zelman, which actually sits very close to one of the limiting cases in the
283
284
285
286

See JONES, supra note 12.
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 312.
Id. at 311.
Id.
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spectrum of coercion suggested above. In Zelman, the secular options
offered students were abysmal traditional district schools 287 and
chartered community schools that, from an academic point of view,
were little better. 288 The only “good” schools available to Cleveland
public school students were, in fact, private, voucher-redeeming
religious schools. 289 The claim that the choice between good-andreligious and bad-but-secular was inadequate, advanced enthusiastically
by the dissenters, was outvoted. The Court was satisfied merely because
there was “no record evidence that any voucher-eligible student was
turned away from a nonreligious private school in the voucher program,
let alone a community or magnet school.” 290 It is not necessary to
imagine some hypothetical family with a strong preference for academic
quality and a weak preference against religion that would choose the
religious option in such a circumstance; the existence of such families
was documented in the Zelman record. 291 The Court upheld the voucher
program nevertheless.
Nor does the result in Zelman depend on the availability of
multiple secular options. The charters as well as the traditional public
schools of Cleveland were secular; this might distinguish the case from
one where a single nonreligious school is the only alternative to a host of
religious charters. But the Zelman Court does not seem to rely upon
this. Had the charters not existed, the result would have been the
same. 292
How can these two strands of dicta be reconciled, one that calls any
difficult decision imposed by the state with religion among the options
“coercive” and the other untroubled by requiring students to choose, by
action or inaction, between the “educational disaster” of publicly funded
schools and the pervasively religious environment of a parochial school?
It is facile, I think, to peg the differences to the passage of time and
changing membership on the Court. Rather, two factors seem
important. One is that families, not children themselves, choose schools
in charter or voucher systems, unlike the choices about football games
and graduations made primarily by students in Santa Fe and Weisman.
Children are susceptible to peer pressure in a way that their parents are
not; and families make their school choice deliberately and privately,
rather than in the hothouse, parent-free environment within a school’s
halls.

287
288
289
290
291
292

Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 644 (2002); id. at 683 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 702 n.10 (Souter, J., dissenting).
See Tushnet, supra note 95, at 13.
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 670–71 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
See infra note 336.
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 697 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Even more important, it seems to me, is that school choice is an
institutional effort to expand, not contract, the choices available to
students. A charter system usually grows the set of secular options for
students, and even in the limiting case does not shrink it. In Santa Fe
and Weisman, by contrast, when the choice is prohibited, what is likely
left is the secular football game and the secular graduation. This
distinction appears to have driven the Zelman Court’s lack of interest in
coercion. Of course, this ignores second-order effects: if religious
choices are not available, there will be more political pressure for good
public schools. But second-order effects do not impact the coercion
experienced by families and children.
The upshot of this analysis is that just as secular public schools are
not required to establish or encourage schools that match the secular
elements of the programs of religious schools that are privately managed
and privately funded, they also need not match the secular program of
religious charter schools, privately managed but publicly funded. 293 In
the most important instance, if there is a charter of high academic
quality that includes religious practice, there need not also be a secular
school of equally high quality. All that is necessary is that there be a
secular program large and flexible enough that any student whose
family prefers secular to religious education can secure a seat in some
secular school.
2.

Entanglement and Primary Effects

The First Amendment prohibits excessive state “entanglement”
with religion. Entanglement concerns are not directly raised by public
regulation of religiously oriented charter schools, as routine state
accreditation and regulation of traditional parochial schools
demonstrates. 294 But one might worry that the obligation to assure a
secular program for all students wanting one, described in the previous
Section, could foster unconstitutional entanglement. This is a relatively
minor concern in areas where there is substantial population density
and reasonable religious diversity, so that a choice program unregulated
as to religious content generates the needed secular alternatives without
government intervention. But as noted above, in areas of the United
States that are deeply and homogeneously religious, a quasi-market
might generate only religious schools of choice. States might then need

293 A similar conclusion is advanced with regard to faith-based prison programs in Volokh,
supra note 88, at 814–15.
294 See Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 764–65 (1976); 2 GREENAWALT, supra
note 91, at 179.
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to intervene in the market mechanism. Even in such circumstances,
however, an entanglement problem seems farfetched.
The regulatory need to assure sufficient secular seats in a quasimarket would not deeply engage state regulators in the operation of
religious schools. To determine whether the state faced a situation
where the quasi-market itself did not generate sufficient secular options,
and how large a secular option must therefore be provided, the
government would need only determine that particular charter schools
had religion in their program. This is hardly the “‘excessive’
entanglement,” 295 “pervasive monitoring,” 296 or “close and continuing
surveillance of religious activities” by government 297 that is
constitutionally problematic. It intrudes government into charters’
operations far less than the supervision of secular teachers working in
religious school buildings that was approved in Agostini. 298
Moreover, there is doubt whether entanglement, on its own
without intent or endorsement, remains a constitutional violation. The
Lemon test, while never formally overruled, itself lives in a twilight of
constitutional doubt. Justice O’Connor argued in 1997 that
entanglement should be treated not as a separate inquiry but as an
“aspect” of Lemon’s “primary effects” test 299: a state program may not
have among its primary effects the advancement or inhibition of
religion. Four Justices reiterated this view in 2000. 300 This test would
clearly be met, for the reasons given above, by charters in many
cosmopolitan, dense communities. What about more homogenous and
religious communities where quasi-markets, by hypothesis, might yield
mostly religious charters, supplemented by a single traditional public
school or a relatively small set of secular options? There the “primary
effect” of such a program might appear to be to advance religious
education.
It is unlikely that the Court would be troubled by such an effect.
First, there is a question of denominator: Is the primary effect of
allowing quasi-markets statewide to advance religion if it has a
cosmopolitan effect in the big cities but a mostly religious effect in some
smaller communities? More important, since Mueller v. Allen 301 the
Court has been unremittingly hostile to the possibility that an otherwise
constitutional policy can be rendered suspect because the sum of private
choices pursuant to that policy have a religious cast. For constitutional
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233–34 (1997).
Id. at 233.
297 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 91, at 179.
298 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234.
299 Id. at 233; cf. 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 91, at 178 (“It is hard to know how much
difference [O’Connor’s recharacterization] may make.”).
300 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 807–08 (2000) (Thomas, J.) (plurality opinion).
301 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
295
296
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purposes, the effects of a market or quasi-market must be divorced from
the contingent choices actually made by market participants. It would
be “absurd” to hold that “a neutral school-choice program might be
permissible” in places where the ratio of secular to religious schools was
high but not in other places where, owing to market demand, the ratio
“happens to be” low. 302 Any religious skew in the pattern of private
choices, so long as that skew is not introduced by government, is
constitutionally “irrelevant.” 303
IV. THE CHARTER QUASI-MARKET
I have argued to this point that, as a matter of federal constitutional
law, states constitutionally may fund charter schools that teach religion
and sponsor religious observance. This does not imply that states must
do so. Either option is constitutional. Although states today universally
elect to limit funding to charter schools that are secular, a correct
understanding of the application of the First Amendment to charters
would probably lead some, but not most, to loosen those prohibitions.
But others will maintain their current statutes. The current uniform
state preference for secularism in charters cannot be attributed entirely,
or even mostly, to confusion about what the First Amendment requires.
This does not, however, moot the question of charters and religion.
Although charters are regulated, they remain privately managed. States
are substantially less well positioned to regulate efforts to test the
church/state boundary when state-regulated private entrepreneurs,
rather than elected officials and bureaucrats, make fine-grained
decisions about how schools will run. State efforts to maintain
secularism in the charter sector will be constrained both by the practical
limitations of their regulatory toolkit and, potentially, by federal First
Amendment rules. The demands of the charter quasi-market and the
creativity of its participants will give rise to diverse and ingenious efforts
to bring publicly-funded education and religious activity closer together.
States will be hard-pressed to maintain the level of secular dominance
that characterized Progressive education in a neoliberal context.
A.

States May Elect to Deny Charters to Religious Schools

Even within a Progressive framework, it is possible to argue that
the First Amendment or its values require states that fund public,
secular schools also fund religious schooling for those who desire it.
302
303

Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 657 (2002).
Id. at 658.
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Professor Michael McConnell and others famously argued that funding
secular but not religious education is a negative subsidy on
constitutionally protected religious exercise, and therefore potentially an
unconstitutional condition. 304 Although a state could restrict its funding
only to secular, Progressive schools if it had a “good faith” belief that
such schools were superior to private schools in realizing goals
“unrelated to religion” such as integrating students or teaching
citizenship, on McConnell’s theory it could not do so in order to
discourage the consumption of religious schooling. 305
This argument, however compelling, is at odds with the enormous
weight of the case law and gained little traction. 306 But the rise of school
choice spurred variations on the claims that distinguished neoliberal
from Progressive contexts. Some scholars argue that although it is
constitutional for states to fund only “public education,” it is less clear
that states, having chosen also to fund “private schools,” can limit such
funding to secular institutions. 307 This argument appeals regardless
whether one thinks religion should be treated no differently than other
sorts of personal commitments 308 or that the Constitution accords
special status to religious beliefs. 309
Claims that states that fund private schools cannot exclude
religious ones took substantial energy from Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors of the University of Virginia, 310 in which the Court held that a
public university that underwrote student publications could not
withhold funds from a publication that proselytized so long as the latter
met the general eligibility requirements for subsidy. 311 I think
Rosenberger is deeply relevant to charter school regulation, for reasons I
suggest below. 312 But the particular argument that a neutral program of
school aid cannot exclude religious schools because of their religiosity
304 Michael W. McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem: Abortions and Religious Schools,
104 HARV. L. REV. 989, 1018 (1991); Michael W. McConnell, Unconstitutional Conditions:
Unrecognized Implications for the Establishment Clause, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 255, 269, 271,
275 (1989) [hereinafter McConnell, Unconstitutional Conditions]; see also MARK G. YUDOF ET
AL., EDUCATION POLICY AND THE LAW 116 n.1 (2012) (collecting literature); Laycock, supra
note 3, at 187.
305 McConnell, Unconstitutional Conditions, supra note 304, at 269.
306 See Laycock, supra note 3, at 172 & n.100.
307 Jesse H. Choper, Federal Constitutional Issues, in SCHOOL CHOICE AND SOCIAL
CONTROVERSY, supra note 100, at 235, 248–49; accord Tushnet, supra note 95, at 15–21. This
debate transcends the educational context. See Tebbe, supra note 264, at 1265 (identifying
exclusion of religion from general funding programs as “an incipient constitutional issue”).
308 The canonical exposition of this view is Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager,
The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61
U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1248 (1994).
309 McConnell, Governments, Families, and Power, supra note 38, at 854.
310 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
311 See Laycock, supra note 3, at 169–70 (discussing Rosenberger); Tebbe, supra note 264, at
1303–06 (same); Tushnet, supra note 95, at 18 (same).
312 See infra notes 383–385 and accompanying text.
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has been substantially impeded by Locke v. Davey, decided by the
Supreme Court in 2004. 313 In Davey, the Court upheld a program of
graduate scholarships that provided state monies to post-secondary
students pursuing their chosen fields, but that excluded students
choosing to pursue a “theology degree.” 314 The Court held that the “play
in the joints” between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses 315
permitted, but did not require, states so to exclude religious education
from otherwise neutral programs of subsidy for study.
There is ample room to argue that Davey does not extend to the
charter school context. The program at issue in Davey excluded degrees
in theology, not theology courses; the opinion explicitly notes that the
program permitted “students to attend pervasively religious schools, so
long as they are accredited.” 316 In the K–12 context, even the most
pervasively religious of charters is not only accredited but spends large
amounts of time teaching secular subjects. 317 For the same reasons it
would be impossible to describe a religious charter student as engaging
in “an essentially religious endeavor . . . akin to a religious calling as well
as an academic pursuit”—the Court’s description of Mr. Davey’s
program of study. 318 And, as Professor McConnell argues, refusing to
fund religious charters is to do what the Davey Court said the
Washington program did not do, namely to “require students to choose
between their religious beliefs and receiving a government benefit.” 319
Nevertheless, Professor Laycock is convincing when he argues that
these persuasive distinctions are likely to be ignored. 320 The
“impressionistic and aesthetic” reading of Davey—that it entitles states
to exclude religious schools from programs that provide otherwise
general funding to schools or students—is likely to prevail for some
time. 321
Certainly the state charter school statutes now in force ubiquitously
require charters to be secular. Most explicitly require charters to be
“nonsectarian” or “nonreligious,” 322 and it is likely that most of the
313 540 U.S. 712 (2004); see Tebbe, supra note 264, at 1266–67, 1306–07 (noting that
Rosenberger and Davey are “in tension”).
314 Davey, 540 U.S. at 718.
315 Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)).
316 Id. at 724.
317 See Laycock, supra note 3, at 184–85.
318 Davey, 540 U.S. at 721.
319 Id. at 720–21.
320 See Laycock, supra note 3, at 185–87.
321 Id. at 186–87 & n.193 (collecting cases).
322 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-183(E)(2) (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-23-103(4)(B)
(2012); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47605(d)(1) (West 2013); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-30.5-104(1)
(2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-66aa(1) (2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 506(a)(2) (2012); FLA.
STAT. § 1002.33(9)(a) (2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-2062(2) (2012); IND. CODE § 20-24-1-4
(2012); IOWA CODE § 256F.4(2)(b) (2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:3991(C)(5) (2012); MD.
CODE ANN., EDUC. § 9-102(1) (West 2013); MINN. STAT. § 124D.10(b)(2), subdiv. 8(d) (2012);
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remainder assume that their requirement that charter schools be
“public” includes a prohibition on religious activity. Some states
probably impose such requirements in the mistaken but conventional
belief that the First Amendment requires them to do so. 323 But they have
other reasons as well. A significant number of state constitutions restrict
public funding of religious institutions more rigorously than does the
federal Constitution, although scholars differ regarding how many of
these states’ provisions will be understood to prevent subsidies that
ultimately flow to religious education. 324 These limitations would fall in
their entirety, of course, if the First Amendment is read to require
funding of religious and secular entities on equal terms, or if the state
constitutional provisions themselves are infirm under the First
Amendment—but both these possibilities, although the subject of
robust theoretical debate, remain remote in practice. 325 On the standard
reading of Davey and the constitutionality of “Blaine amendments” and
cognate state provisions, states may under federal law choose to
foreclose religious participation in charter programs, and therefore
whether they must do so depends upon the religion jurisprudence each
state has developed under its own constitution. 326
States also have fiscal and political reasons for maintaining an allsecular chartering system. Ten percent of American children are
MO. REV. STAT. § 160.405(4)(1) (2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 194-B:1(III) (2013); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 22-8B-4(J) (2012); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2854(2)(a) (McKinney 2012); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3314.029(A)(1)(d) (West 2012); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 3-136(A)(2) (2012); 24 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 17-1715-A(4)–(5) (West 2012) (“A charter school shall be nonsectarian in
all operations . . . [and] shall not provide any religious instruction, nor shall it display religious
objects and symbols.”); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-77-3.1(d) (2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-40-40(1)
(2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-1a-507(1) (West 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-212.5(B)
(2012); WIS. STAT. § 118.40(4)(a)(2) (2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 21-3-304(a) (2012); cf. NEV.
REV. STAT. § 386.505(3) (2011) (prohibiting “formation of charter schools on the basis of a
single race, religion or ethnicity”). But cf. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 380.522(1) (2012) (“To the
extent disqualified under the state or federal constitution, an urban high school academy shall
not be organized by a church or other religious organization and shall not have any
organizational or contractual affiliation with or constitute a church or other religious
organization.” (emphasis added)).
323 Notable here is New Hampshire’s incorporation, in its chartering statute, of the federal
Lemon test as the method of “determining whether a proposed chartered public school is a
prohibited religious school.” N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 194-B:7 (2012).
324 See Mark Edward DeForrest, An Overview and Evaluation of State Blaine Amendments:
Origins, Scope, and First Amendment Concerns, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 551, 555–57 (2003);
Nicole Stelle Garnett, Affordable Private Education and the Middle Class City, 77 U. CHI. L.
REV. 201, 218 (2010); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Zelman’s Future: Vouchers, Sectarian
Providers, and the Next Round of Constitutional Battles, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 917, 959–60
(2003) [hereinafter Lupu & Tuttle, Zelman’s Future]. Some scholars also continue to argue that
these state bars are themselves unconstitutional.
325 See Lupu & Tuttle, Zelman’s Future, supra note 324, at 969–70. On the possible
unconstitutionality of state “Little Blaine Amendments” that bar state funding of sectarian
organizations, see Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828 (2000) (Thomas, J.) (plurality opinion);
Tushnet, supra note 95, at 15–18 (discussing Justice Thomas’s Mitchell opinion).
326 See Lupu & Tuttle, Zelman’s Future, supra note 324, at 960 & nn.198–99.
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enrolled in private school, and roughly eighty-five percent of those
attend schools with religious affiliations. 327 These students’ parents are a
fiscal blessing to states and localities: they forgo expensive government
services while still paying taxes. If religious schools could easily recast
themselves as charters and thereby gain access to public funding, the
drain on education budgets would be both substantial and sudden. 328
Some states address this problem by prohibiting the conversion of
existing private schools to charters; 329 but since parents can switch
schools, this is only a partial fix.
Finally, there are nonfiscal ideological and political reasons for
excluding religious education from charter programs. States may have
separationist preferences. They may wish not to fund the educational
practices of particular minority sects. They may have no stomach for
litigation or controversy in this area. They may think that
nonsectarianism enhances public support for charters. There are many
other possible motivations.
It seems plausible to think that many or all of these factors help
motivate the requirement in state positive law that charters not be
religious. A correct understanding of the application of the First
Amendment to charters would not lead all states to change course. But
the mistaken view that charters cannot be religious surely has an effect.
Its correction would surely move some states towards relaxing the
nonsectarianism requirement, especially those where the agenda of
evangelical Christian educators 330 and their allies 331 is strong. This
coalition’s clout has led several states and districts systematically to
resist the First Amendment constraints on Progressive education. 332
Should voters and elected officials in these areas come to view religious
chartering as constitutional, the requirement that charters be secular
would likely be loosened in a significant number of jurisdictions.

327 See Facts and Studies, CAPE: COUNCIL FOR AMERICAN PRIVATE EDUCATION,
http://www.capenet.org/facts.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2013) (citing reports from the National
Center for Education Statistics, containing data for the 2009–2010 school year).
328 See JANET D. MULVEY, BRUCE S. COOPER & ARTHUR T. MALONEY, BLURRING THE LINES:
CHARTER, PUBLIC, PRIVATE, AND RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS COMING TOGETHER 32 (2010)
(documenting concern in New York City over “the stress that would be placed on public
schools if all students from . . . closed Catholic schools entered the public school system”).
329 See infra note 370.
330 See STEPHEN ARONS, SHORT ROUTE TO CHAOS: CONSCIENCE, COMMUNITY, AND THE RECONSTITUTION OF AMERICAN SCHOOLING 55–58 (1997); ROBERT WUTHNOW, RED STATE
RELIGION: FAITH AND POLITICS IN AMERICA’S HEARTLAND 295–97, 303–11 (2012).
331 See MELISSA M. DECKMAN, SCHOOL BOARD BATTLES: THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT IN LOCAL
POLITICS 16 (2004).
332 See KENNETH M. DOLBEARE & PHILLIP E. HAMMOND, THE SCHOOL PRAYER DECISIONS:
FROM COURT POLICY TO LOCAL PRACTICE 31–32 & fig.7 (1971); 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 91,
at 106.
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The Limits of Regulatory Oversight

That states are entitled to exclude religious schools from chartering
does not end the matter. Chartering, and educational neoliberalism
more generally, shift decisionmaking power from public to private
actors. Private actors determine how charters behave; government
regulates, but does not make, those determinations. Because demand for
religious schooling is large, one expects educational entrepreneurs to
create schools that come as close as possible to meeting that demand,
subject to their regulatory constraints. Charter schools will therefore
push against limitations upon their religious activity. States will find it
difficult, and even potentially unlawful, fully to prevent such moves—if
they even want to, which not all states will. 333
This is not to say that regulatory power is insubstantial. If state law
forbids “sectarian” or “religious” charter schools, then a charter school
cannot organize itself as a religious private school does. It cannot
organize prayers, nor can it teach the truth of the Bible or of other
religious propositions. But these are not the only things that religious
schools do, nor are they only things that draw parents towards religious
schools. Religious schools have unique substantive and procedural
approaches to teaching culture, inculcating values, and maintaining
discipline. 334 They emphasize particular topics and approaches in
teaching social studies, literature, history, and science. 335 Especially
important, their students often reach high levels of academic
achievement. 336 A school that cannot pray or teach religious truth will
probably not appeal to the core constituencies of existing private
religious schools that enroll in order to provide their children with
religious education. But such a school could easily enjoy broad appeal
among more marginal consumers that appreciate these other aspects of
religious education—with the added enticement of being tuition-free.
These parents, like all parent-consumers in a quasi-market, have buying
power to which charter entrepreneurs will respond.
See Minow, Seduction of Choice, supra note 34, at 839 & n.103.
See JONES, supra note 12, at 40, 43.
335 See id. at 43, 117, 152–53.
336 See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., PRESERVING A CRITICAL NATIONAL ASSET: AMERICA’S
DISADVANTAGED STUDENTS AND THE CRISIS IN FAITH-BASED URBAN SCHOOLS 6–8 (2008);
Margaret F. Brinig & Nicole Stelle Garnett, Catholic Schools, Urban Neighborhoods, and
Education Reform, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 887, 901 (2010); cf. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536
U.S. 639 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[A]lmost two out of three families using vouchers [in
Cleveland] to send their children to religious schools did not embrace the religion of those
schools. The families made it clear they had not chosen the schools because they wished their
children to be proselytized in a religion not their own, or in any religion, but because of
educational opportunity.” (citations to the record omitted)); Garnett, supra note 324, at 214
(implying that her mostly Catholic neighbors enroll their children in Catholic schools more
because of the schools’ record of academic achievement than their families’ religiosity).
333
334
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This is no theoretical exercise. Across the country, charter schools
have been established that begin with a religious program and then strip
out its explicitly religious elements. More than a trivial residue remains.
Charter schools with roots in both the Catholic and Protestant
educational establishments, for example, find substitutes when they
forgo prayer and explicit Christian instruction. 337 When the Trinidad
Campus of the Center City Public Charter School in Washington, D.C.
morphed from Catholic to charter school, it replaced the Lord’s Prayer
with students’ daily recital of a promise to “pursue personal excellence
in character, conduct and scholarship.” 338 But Trinidad maintains a
school “shrine . . . dedicated to the school’s core values: collaboration,
compassion, curiosity, discipline, integrity, justice, knowledge,
peacemaking, perseverance and respect.” 339 The school also maintained
the leftover “stone cross at the entrance of the school,” and continues to
employ the same teachers and nuns that worked for the building’s
former tenants. 340 Likewise, the Nampa Charter School in Idaho denies
that it is a “Christian school,” but deploys curriculum and training
developed for private Christian schools, teaches Latin, and forbids sex
education. 341 It also includes the Bible among the “major text[s]” of
Western civilization in its history classes, 342 accepting the invitation of
the Court in Abington School District v. Schempp to deploy the Bible as a
secular text. 343
Schools like these, whether spun off from private religious schools
or free-standing, have been described as “religious/cultural charters” 344
and, more critically, as “religious schools-lite.” 345 They have been
especially attractive to religious minorities. For such groups, it is of
337 Discrete Christian denominations, such as the Mormons and the Amish, are also
involved in chartering. See FINN, MANNO & VANOUREK, supra note 52, at 161.
338 MULVEY, COOPER & MALONEY, supra note 328, at 29.
339 Id.
340 Id.; see also Nicole Stelle Garnett, Are Charters Enough Choice? School Choice and the
Future of Catholic Schools, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1891, 1891–93 (2012) (documenting a
similar transformation of a Catholic school to a charter school in Indianapolis); Sugarman &
Kuboyama, supra note 49, at 875 (noting concern over charters that rent religious buildings
whose “pupils . . . [are] largely drawn from the congregation of the landlord”). But see Carolyn
Slutsky, Hebrew Charter School to Displace Shul, N.Y. JEWISH WK., July 22, 2009 (on file with
author) (Hebrew-language charter insisting upon the removal of all religious symbols from a
rented synagogue before taking possession).
341 MULVEY, COOPER & MALONEY, supra note 328, at 96.
342 Id. at 35.
343 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (“It certainly may be said that the Bible is worthy of study for its
literary and historic qualities. Nothing we have said . . . indicates that . . . study of the Bible or
of religion, when presented objectively as part of a secular program of education, may not be
effected consistently with the First Amendment.”).
344 Marcia J. Harr Bailey & Bruce S. Cooper, The Introduction of Religious Charter Schools: A
Cultural Movement in the Private School Sector, 18 J. RES. ON CHRISTIAN EDUC. 272, 272 (2009).
345 Charles J. Russo & Gerald M. Cattaro, Faith-Based Charter Schools, 36 RELIGION & EDUC.
72, 83 (2009).
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critical religious importance to maintain cultural and linguistic
traditions that are confessionally fundamental, but technically secular,
in content. 346 Bailey and Cooper identify such charters founded by
Muslim, Jewish, Greek Orthodox, and Hmong communities. 347 These
schools teach “the history, customs, and language of the religion during
the required school day.” 348 They all eschew school-organized prayer
and the teaching of religious truths, but differ to a significant extent in
the extent to which they push the religious/secular boundary. Some
schools display symbols that straddle that line, observe religious dietary
laws in their cafeterias, and/or close for religious holidays—and others
do not. 349 A well-studied Islamic charter school, the Tarek Ibn Ziyad
academy, found itself in court over its policy of, while not sponsoring
prayers directly, recessing formal classes and providing space for
student-organized worship. 350 Some Hebrew charter schools err in the
other direction, not requiring Hebrew language instruction but merely
offering it as an elective. 351
The teaching of languages with special religious import but that are
also secular tongues—Arabic, Greek, Hebrew, Latin—is particularly
significant because an important attraction of charter schools is their
ability to organize themselves around particular themes or topics. 352
Chartering invites niche marketing, even to idiosyncratic interests, so
long as schools can command students in the quasi-marketplace. 353 One
346 See, e.g., MINOW, IN BROWN’S WAKE, supra note 27, at 105 (describing religious
separatist Jews seeking their own school district for reasons “of religious, linguistic, and cultural
identity”).
347 Bailey & Cooper, supra note 344, at 272.
348 Id. at 277.
349 See Benjamin Siracusa Hillman, Note, Is There a Place for Religious Charter Schools?, 118
YALE L.J. 554, 570 (2008). It is important to note that traditional public schools with substantial
enrolment from discrete religious minorities sometimes follow similar practices. See, e.g.,
MICHAEL S. MERRY, CULTURE, IDENTITY, AND ISLAMIC SCHOOLING: A PHILOSOPHICAL
APPROACH 26 (2007) (noting that the two public high schools in Dearborn, Michigan “offers
[sic] bilingual classes in Arabic, accommodate Islamic holidays, excuse those students who are
inclined toward Friday prayers, and offer halal meat in its [sic] cafeteria”).
350 See id. at 565; Bailey & Cooper, supra note 344, at 279–80.
351 See Julie Wiener, L.A. Charter Tests Genre, N.Y. JEWISH WK., May 10, 2011, available at
http://www.thejewishweek.com/news/national/la_charter_tests_genre.
352 E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-1903(b) (2012) (“A charter school also may be organized
around a special emphasis, theme or concept . . . .”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 194-B:1-a(III)
(2013) (stating that one purpose of chartering is to “[e]ncourage the establishment
of . . . schools with specific or focused curriculum, instruction, methods, or target pupil
groups”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 3-136(A)(3) (2012) (“A charter school may offer a curriculum
which emphasizes a specific learning philosophy or style or certain subject areas such as
mathematics, science, fine arts, performance arts, or foreign language.”); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 49-13-104(1) (2012) (providing for charters with “a distinctive, thematic program”).
353 See, e.g., FINN, MANNO & VANOUREK, supra note 52, at 163; Karen Abercrombie, In A
Detroit Suburb, an Automaker’s Vision Gets New Life, EDUC. WK., Mar. 4, 1998, at 6 (reporting
on a charter school based on manufacturing); Ray Parker, Unique Charter School Offers Lessons
in Horse Sense, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Oct. 1, 2009), http://www.azcentral.com/community/mesa/
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of the most significant niches is filled by charters whose programs,
though open to all, reflect the interests of specific racial, ethnic, and
linguistic identity groups. 354 Hebrew- and Arabic-language charters in
particular are presented, with some justification, as catering to linguistic
and ethnic, as much as religious, cultures. Dean Minow, for example,
includes them in her discussion of charters that emphasize Spanish and
Chinese. 355
Some of these same charters, however, have found ways to
supplement their programs with privately provided religious education.
This practice honors legal boundaries but still provides the
religious/secular synthesis previously monopolized by private religious
schools. For example, private providers sometimes offer programs of
afterschool religious education exclusively to students in a particular
“religious/cultural charter.” 356 Some charters insist that such programs
be provided off-site, to emphasize their formal separation from the
publicly subsidized program; others feel no such compunctions. 357
More inventively, entrepreneurs have deployed the “cyber” or
“virtual” charter form to religious (and competitive) advantage.
Providing instruction online rather than through physical teacher/pupil
interaction is a still-small but growing trend in K–12 education, and one
rapidly taking on outsize importance. 358 Sensing its potential to realize
cost savings, improve access, and allow educational customization, a
number of states are experimenting with virtual education, and most of
these permit its use by charter as well as traditional public schools. 359
articles/2009/10/01/20091001mr-equineskl1002.html (reporting on a charter based on equine
and veterinary subjects).
354 See RAVITCH, supra note 42, at 124–25 (“Ethnic groups embraced [charter schools] as a
refuge in which to teach their cultural heritage.”); Bruce Fuller, Growing Charter Schools,
Decentering the State, in INSIDE CHARTER SCHOOLS: THE PARADOX OF RADICAL
DECENTRALIZATION 1, 7 (Bruce Fuller ed., 2000).
355 MINOW, IN BROWN’S WAKE, supra note 27, at 45.
356 See MULVEY, COOPER & MALONEY, supra note 328, at 97 (noting efforts by New Orleans
Baptist Missions to form charters by “adopting an existing school”); Julie Wiener, For Charters’
Jewish Cousins, So Near, So Far, N.Y. JEWISH WK., Dec. 28, 2010, available at http://www.the
jewishweek.com/print/14288 (surveying this practice at Hebrew-language charter schools and
reporting that such programs attract between twenty and thirty percent of students in the
charters).
357 See Wiener, supra note 356.
358 JAY GREENE ET AL., BROWN CTR. ON EDUC. POL’Y AT BROOKINGS, EXPANDING CHOICE IN
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION: A REPORT ON RETHINKING THE FEDERAL ROLE IN
EDUCATION 16 (2010), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2010/
0202_school_choice/0202_school_choice.pdf; PAUL PETERSON, SAVING SCHOOLS: FROM
HORACE MANN TO VIRTUAL LEARNING 231–34 (2010); J. SCHNITZ, & J.E. YOUNG, MODELS OF
VIRTUAL SCHOOLING (1999), available at http://www-03.ibm.com/industries/ca/en/education/
k12/pdf/virtualschool.pdf; Aaron J. Saiger, Changing the Conversation in Education Law:
Political Geography and Virtual Schooling, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 337, 355–57 (2012) [hereinafter
Saiger, Changing the Conversation].
359 See FLA. STAT. §§ 1002.33, 1002.45(d (2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 33-5205(1)(b) (2012);
MINN. STAT. §§ 124D.095, 124D.10 (2012) (extending state “Online Learning Option Act” to
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Most cyber-schools are charters, 360 and these schools serve tens of
thousands of students. 361
In the context of religious education, asynchronicity is a key aspect
of cyber-schooling. Asynchronous charter students can log on for
school at times and places of their own choosing, in the cyber-analogue
to the pre-internet correspondence course. 362 Steven L. Jones
provocatively calls virtual charters “public schools in the home”; 363 but
although most virtual instruction takes place at home, it need not.
Asynchronicity allows students in a private religious school each to
enroll in a secular cybercharter, as individuals, and receive their secular
education at times and places as directed by the religious teaching staff,
even as religious instruction itself remains privately funded. 364 A
charters); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3301.079, 3302.41 (West 2012) (defining “blended
learning” as “the delivery of instruction in a combination of time in a supervised physical
location away from home and online delivery whereby the student has some element of control
over time, place, path, or pace of learning” and allowing community schools to use a “blended
learning model”); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 329.840, 338.005 (2012) (creating the Oregon Virtual
School District and granting access to it to “public charter schools”; also creating “virtual public
charter schools” that provide online courses and have no physical location); 24 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 17-1741-A to 17-1751-A (rules for “cyber charter schools”) (West 2012); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 59-40-40 (2012) (inviting charters to provide “virtual services”); WIS. STAT. § 118.40(8)
(2011). Contra MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. §§ 7-1401(c), 7-1402(a), 9-102(12) (West 2013)
(authorizing “virtual schools” but allowing only “county board[s]” to sponsor them, whereas
charter schools must “[r]equir[e] students to be physically present on school premises for a
period of time substantially similar to that which other public school students spend on school
premises.”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-13-106(c)(2) (2012) (“No cyber-based public charter
school may be authorized.”). See generally Thomas Clark, Virtual Schooling and Basic
Education, in ECONOMICS OF DISTANCE AND ONLINE LEARNING: THEORY PRACTICE, AND
RESEARCH 52, 57–58 (William J. Bramble & Santosh Panda eds., 2008) (detailing reach of
online charters); Greene et al., supra note 358 (advocating a substantial expansion of virtual
chartering).
360 See JOHN WATSON, BUSH GEMIN & JENNIFER RYAN, KEEPING PACE WITH K–12 ONLINE
LEARNING: A REVIEW OF STATE-LEVEL POLICY AND PRACTICE 8 (2008).
361 See id.; SLOAN CONSORTIUM, K–12 ONLINE LEARNING: A 2008 FOLLOW-UP OF THE
SURVEY OF U.S. SCHOOL DISTRICT ADMINISTRATORS 1 (Jan. 2009), available at
http://www.sloanconsortium.org/sites/default/files/k-12_online_learning_2008.pdf (presenting
data from a survey of school districts during the 2007–2008 finding that 75% of responding
districts had at least one student enrolled in an online or blended course and that two-thirds of
these districts expect growth in online enrollments); Garnett, supra note 340, at 1899 (reporting
a 2008 count of “185 ‘virtual’ charter schools in twenty-five states”); Trip Gabriel, More Pupils
Are Learning Online, Fueling Debate on Quality, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2011, at A1 (reporting
estimate of 1 million students involved in some form of online or blended education). These
schools bring their share of disputes. See Stephanie Saul, Profits and Questions at Online
Charter Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2011, at A1; State Moves to Shut Down Minn.’s First
Online Charter, EDUC. WK., Mar. 16, 2011, at 4; Dakarai I. Aarons, Colo. Charter Dispute Stirs
Oversight Issues; Riven by Firings, Infighting, Noted School Network Is Challenge for Authorizers,
EDUC. WK., Oct. 7, 2009, at 8.
362 See BURCH, supra note 36, at 77; WATSON, GEMIN & RYAN, supra note 360, at 10; Edward
Lin, Comment, “Virtual” Schools: Real Discrimination, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 177, 178 (2008)
(cataloging secular motivations for online schooling).
363 JONES, supra note 12, at 89.
364 See Saiger, Changing the Conversation, supra note 358, at 359.
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handful of religious schools have adopted this model, 365 which allows
the interpenetration of secular and religious instruction:
[A] religious teacher might work with half the class on some religious
topic while the other half, on its own for the moment, engages in
secular cyber-study under the teacher’s passive supervision. Or a
cleric might begin a 45-minute English lesson with a prayer—right
before secular studies begin—or interrupt a cyber-biology lesson to
admonish students that “[t]his evolution bit is straight from
Satan.” 366

Such environments could quite closely approximate the current
practices of many pervasively religious private schools and religious
homeschooling families. But while in the private and homeschooling
contexts parents pay for secular studies (in the former case with their
money and the latter with their time 367), this model shifts these costs to
the state. This potentially large reduction in parental costs could induce
considerably more of them to seek religious schooling than do today. 368
Such strategies are extremely difficult for states to block by
regulation, especially without impeding a large amount of desirable
chartering activity. It is not just that regulatory limitations are subject to
politics and lobbying; 369 it is more that regulation is a blunt tool with
which to confront the religiously-motivated entrepreneur. So, some
states have forbidden religious private schools or private schools in
general from converting to charters, 370 as the Trinidad campus did. 371
365 Julie Wiener, Has Tech Reached the Tipping Point?, N.Y. JEWISH WK., July 26, 2011,
available at http://www.thejewishweek.com/news/new_york/has_tech_reached_tipping_point
(describing an Orthodox Jewish yeshiva in Los Angeles that teaches religious studies using
traditional face-to-face instruction from the first bell until 2 PM, whereupon all students pursue
secular studies as cybercharter students under the physical supervision of the religious teaching
staff).
366 Saiger, Changing the Conversation, supra note 358, at 359 (quoting Guy Lancaster, “This
Evolution Bit is Straight from Satan”: McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education and the
Democratization of Southern Christianity, 33 RELIGION & EDUC. 69, 84 (2006)).
367 See Michelle R. Davis, “Hybrid” Charter Schools on the Rise, EDUC. WK., June 15, 2011
(reporting that families cannot take full advantage of virtual education without “ability to have
their children at home or supervised in their workspace”).
368 See MERRY, supra note 349, at 28, 33, 38 (noting financial pressures on Islamic schools
and parents); Garnett, supra note 340, at 1897 (noting similar pressures on Catholic schools);
Jack Wertheimer, The High Cost of Jewish Living, COMMENTARY (Mar. 2010), at 17, 17–18
(noting similar pressures on Jewish schools and parents), available at http://www.commentary
magazine.com/article/the-high-cost-of-jewish-living/.
369 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 715 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“A day
will come when religious schools will learn what political leverage can do . . . .”).
370 See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47602(b) (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 502 (2012) (“No
private or religiously affiliated school may apply to become a charter school.”); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-2-2062(2) (2012) (stating “sectarian schools” and “religious schools” as well as “private for
profit schools” and “existing private schools” may not petition for charter status); 105 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/27A-4(c) (West 2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 89(d) (2012); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3314.01(A)(2) (West 2012) (“No nonpublic chartered or nonchartered school in
existence on January 1, 1997, is eligible to become a community school under this chapter”); id.
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States also sometimes forbid “home-based” institutions from seeking
charters. 372 Such bans essentially invite groups to reorganize and set up
new schools rather than converting old ones, 373 even as they can deprive
the new schools of valuable assets, including appropriate real estate. 374
Two schools can have different corporate identities but still share, for
example, the same directors, staff, or facilities. 375 States can respond in
turn by forbidding such arrangements also. 376 But this, in addition to
§ 3314.029(A)(1)(d) (charter applications must include “statement that the school . . . will not
be operated by a sectarian school or religious institution”); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-1717-A(a) (West 2012) (“No charter school shall be established or funded by and no
charter shall be granted to any sectarian school, institution or other entity.”); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 16-77-3.1(d) (2012) (“No private or parochial schools shall be eligible for charter public
school status”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-13-106(c)(1) (2012) (“No charter agreement shall be
granted under this chapter that authorizes the conversion of any private, parochial, cyber-based
or home-based school to charter status.”); WIS. STAT. § 118.40(3)(c)(2) (2011) (“A school board
may not enter into a contract that would result in the conversion of a private, sectarian school
to a charter school”). WYO. STAT. ANN. § 21-3-303(c) (2012).
371 See J.C. Reindl, Knight Academy Charter School Scheduled to Open in West Toledo,
TOLEDO BLADE, July 11, 2008, available at http://www.toledoblade.com/Education/2008/07/11/
Knight-Academy-charter-school-scheduled-to-open-in-West-Toledo.html (affiliation of a new
charter with existing Catholic school).
372 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-30.5-104(1) (2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 506(a)(2)
(2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-2062(2) (2012); MINN. STAT. § 124D.10 subdiv. 8(e) (2012)
(“Charter schools must not be used as a method of providing education or generating revenue
for students who are being home-schooled.”) NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 386.505(1), 386.506 (2011);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 194-B:1(III) (2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22 8B 4(J) (2012); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 59-40-40(1) (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-13-106(c)(1) (2012); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 53A-1a-504(3) (West 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-212.5(B) (2012); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§§ 21-3-303(c), 21-3-304(a) (2012).
373 See Christopher O’Donnell, The ‘C’ Will Stand for ‘Charter’ Next Year, SARASOTA
HERALD-TRIBUNE, Nov. 2, 2009, at A01, available at http://www.heraldtribune.com/article/
20091102/ARTICLE/911021059 (reporting that rather than convert to a charter school,
leadership of Palmetto Christian School in Florida “closing” the school in the summer and
“opening Palmetto Charter School at the start of the new school year”); see also id. (noting
seven similar closures-followed-by charter-openings by the Archdiocese of Miami).
374 Cf. GORDON, supra note 15, at 57 (stating that in the 1940s and 1950s, “[t]here were
significant ties in many areas between public schools and Catholic educators,” and that local
officials “[o]ften . . . used church buildings as public elementary and secondary schools”)
375 See Mary Shanklin & Vicki McClure, Deals and Debts, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 26,
2007, at A1, available at http://www.orlandosentinel.com/orl-special-charterschools-part2,0,59
24982.htmlpage (reporting that Rio Grande Charter School of Excellence in Orlando FL “shares
board members, facilities and funding with New Covenant Baptist Church”).
376 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 380.522 (2012) (“To the extent disqualified under the state or
federal constitution, an urban high school academy shall not be organized by a church or other
religious organization and shall not have any organizational or contractual affiliation with or
constitute a church or other religious organization.”); MINN. STAT. § 124D.10 subdiv. 3(b)(2)
(2012) (stating that charter organizers may not be “nonpublic sectarian or religious institution;
any person other than a natural person that directly or indirectly, through one or more
intermediaries, controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with the nonpublic
sectarian or religious institution; and any other charitable organization under this clause that in
the federal IRS Form 1023, Part IV, describes activities indicating a religious purpose”); id.
§ 124D.10 subdiv. 8(d) (“A charter school . . . authorizer may not authorize a charter school or
program that is affiliated with a nonpublic sectarian school or a religious institution.”); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 115C-238.29F(b) (prohibiting charters “affiliated with a nonpublic sectarian
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further depriving new charters of potentially important experience and
support, mostly induces converting schools to replace formal affiliation
or overlaps with informal ties. 377 States worried that private schools
might form or adopt charters for their students’ secular studies, while
retaining their enrollment for religious education, have also sought to
block that practice; 378 once again, it seems fairly easy to reconfigure the
private school as an extracurricular institute in order to evade such
restrictions. 379 These regulations resemble squeezing a balloon. 380
Ultimately, states cannot, even if they want to, prohibit adherents of a
particular faith from participating in chartering.
The other way that states could restrict charters that push the
envelope of religious instruction is to exercise discretion in approving
and denying charter applications. Such discretion is available and, in
those states that impose quotas on the total number of charters, 381
unavoidable. But while in the Progressive context, discretion is used to
avoid even hints of religiosity in schools that are the single free option
for all, the same techniques, when deployed in the neoliberal context
against private providers, can come to seem like antireligious animus.
Of course, these charters are carefully not religious, as a technical
matter. But that does not mean that opposition to chartering individuals
and groups that appear to have roots in religious communities, or who
have particular values, cannot be deemed anti-religious discrimination.
The Court’s religion cases, up to and emphatically including Davey,
disfavor regulatory burdens upon religious exercise of this nature. 382
The neoliberal structure of chartering also increases the salience of
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia. 383 The
school or a religious institution”) (2012); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 3-136(A)(2) (2012) (same); OR.
REV. STAT. § 338.035(7) (2012) (same); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-77-3.1(d) (2012) (same).
377 See MULVEY, COOPER & MALONEY, supra note 328, at 63–64 (reviewing the relationship
between the Muslim American Society of Minnesota and the Tarek ibn Ziyad school); Jennifer
Smith Richards, A School Retooled, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 8, 2010, at 1A (reporting that
the state acquiesces to a charter’s claims that its links to a closed Christian “private school are
superficial” even though it “has the same founder, is staffed by many of the same teachers and
attended by many of the same students” and uses the same building).
378 See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47602(b) (West 2012) (forbidding the conversion of private
schools to charter schools; also “[n]o charter school shall receive any public funds for a pupil if
the pupil also attends a private school that charges the pupil’s family for tuition”).
379 See supra notes 356–357.
380 See Mead, supra note 47, at 356–57.
381 See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 47602(a) (West 2012); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 5, § 11968 (West
2013); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/27A-4(b) (2012); MINN. STAT. § 120.064 (2012); N.Y. EDUC. LAW
§ 2852(9) (McKinney 2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-77-3.1(g) (2012). See generally CTR. FOR
EDUC. REFORM, CHARTER SCHOOL LAWS ACROSS THE STATES 2012, at 8–9 (Alison Consoletti
ed., 13th ed. 2012), available at http://www.edreform.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/CER_
2012_Charter_Laws.pdf.
382 See Laycock, supra note 3, at 162, 214 (“[Davey] authorizes discriminatory funding, but it
does not authorize discriminatory regulation.”).
383 515 U.S. 819 (1995).

SAIGER.34.4 (Do Not Delete)

2013]

4/19/2013 12:06 PM

CHARTERS AND THE NEOLIBERAL TURN

1223

prism of free speech applies naturally to the chartering context.
Operating a charter school, like the use of public school property or the
publication of magazines under university auspices, is open to all under
neutral principles. 384 The regulatory apparatus of charter schooling
bears a strong family resemblance to the detailed but neutral rules that
governed university subsidies for student publication in Rosenberger. 385
And, again, the issue is not discrimination against religion per se but
against views and practices tinged with religion. With respect to such
elements of a charter program, viewpoint neutrality might well be a
constitutional requirement.
In short, the institution of chartering itself, through its reliance on
private providers and its choice of regulation rather than bureaucracy as
the method of state control, creates a great deal of room for creative
businesspeople to satisfy the demand for religious education, especially
at the margin. Even if the claim that charters may be religious is
rejected, chartering still has the potential to bring about a monumental
shift in the relationship between church and state in American
education. Where in a Progressive world government could enforce
American schools characterized by strict separation, in a neoliberal one
demand in the marketplace inevitably makes such boundaries more
porous.
V. THE EVOLVING LANDSCAPE OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION
AND PUBLIC SUBSIDY
Neoliberalism is not the first, last, or biggest shift in educational
and religious cultures to affect the tortuous course of the relationship
between American religion and American schools. Nevertheless, it is
surely significant. The rise of chartering creates the opportunity for
substantial public funds to flow to religious and quasi-religious schools.
The outsize importance of both church and school in American society,
and the richness of America’s history of interaction between them, 386
make it impossible fully to predict the consequences of this momentous
change. In this brief conclusion, I suggest only that there are (at least)
four important places to look.
First, more American pupils will receive religious and religiously
inflected education. Some states will likely allow religious charters and
quasi-religious ones will seek students nationwide. The rise of these
384 Id. at 830; Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393
(1993).
385 515 U.S. at 823–25.
386 See GREEN, BIBLE, SCHOOL, AND CONSTITUTION, supra note 80, at 225–27, 251–325;
GORDON, supra note 15; JONES, supra note 12.
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schools reduces the effective price of religious education. This will
benefit some families already paying for religious schooling, but a
greater impact will be felt among families whose budget constraints lead
them to prefer traditional public schools over paying tuition. These
families are the natural target market for religious charter
entrepreneurs. Suppliers will seek to bundle religious content, cultural
aspects of religious schooling, and secular programs in ways that will be
attractive to these families. How they do so, and to a lesser extent how
states regulate their efforts, will determine much about the kind of
schooling that many American students receive.
Chartering is also a harbinger of great challenge for traditional
private religious schools. Private schools, especially religious ones, have
long been a locus for dissent over public schooling and play a pivotal
role in American education and in the national conversation over
educational values. 387 This vital sector will have to respond to its new
competitive environment. 388 Existing religious schools, like any private
business, focus particularly on their marginal consumers, the group that
will be targeted by new competition from charters. The early anecdotes
of private schools converting to charters 389 suggest that one response is
contraction, with schools accepting more regulation and less overt
religiosity in exchange for state subsidy; but this will hardly be the only
or even the modal change. The kind of religious education that private
religious schools offer will also shift. It was hoped that neoliberalism
would induce change in traditional public schools by introducing
competition into their environment; for similar reasons it will change
the religious school sector. Not all such changes will be universally
welcomed throughout the existing private-school industry.
The third potential effect of religious chartering is to alter the
dynamic by which certain American communities of faith understand
themselves to be alienated and excluded from the enterprise of public
education. 390 These communities never reconciled themselves to court
decisions regarding school prayer, Bible reading, and the teaching of
evolution. 391 Religious chartering makes room for a reorientation of
See CARPER & HUNT, supra note 14; JONES, supra note 12, at 101.
See JONES, supra note 12, at 21 (noting the impact of “‘free,’ nonsectarian public schools”
upon denominational schools in the nineteenth century).
389 See supra notes 328–343, 370–371 and accompanying text.
390 See JONES, supra note 12, at 165 (“[S]ome Protestants, though certainly not all, have
joined segments of the Catholic, Jewish, and Muslim communities on the institutional sidelines
of American education.”); Carper & Hunt, supra note 80, at 85–86.
391 See MICHAEL BERKMAN & ERIC PLUTZER, EVOLUTION, CREATIONISM, AND THE BATTLE
TO CONTROL AMERICA’S CLASSROOMS 13–16 (2010) (collecting bibliography); BRUCE J.
DIERENFIELD, THE BATTLE OVER SCHOOL PRAYER: HOW ENGLE V. VITALE CHANGED AMERICA
189 (2007); Clyde Wilcox & Sam Potolicchio, The Christian Right and Church-State Issues, in
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 387, 391 (Derek H. Davis
ed., 2010).
387
388
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school politics, in which religious groups become both more supportive
of and more involved in “public” schooling as an enterprise. 392 This
might well lead to new thinking about how religious and secular
schooling could better reflect shared democratic values and public
purpose. 393 Again, such reorientations will encourage some and chagrin
others.
Finally, religious charter schools will blur boundaries among
school, church, and public sector, institutions which in a Progressive era
were more nearly discrete. Parents and broader society will increasingly
understand the choice of religious schooling not as opting out but as
one way of fully participating in the civic enterprise of education. 394
What religious charters do not portend is any substantial shift in
Americans’ understanding of the First Amendment or its application to
schools. When it prohibited formal school prayer in 1963, the Supreme
Court declared that “[t]he very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to
withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy,
[and] to place them beyond the reach of majorities and
officials. . . . One’s right to . . . freedom of worship . . . and other
fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the
outcome of no elections.” 395 These principles are fully respected in a
neoliberal world where religious and secular groups alike charter
schools that they desire and that they believe consumers in the
educational marketplace will prefer.

See GORDON, supra note 15, at 56–57.
See id. at 59–80; JONES, supra note 12, at 101–10; David Sikkink, Conservative
Protestants, Schooling, and Democracy, in 1 EVANGELICALS AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 276,
279 (Steven Brint & Jean Reith Schroedel eds., 2009).
394 See Richard W. Garnett, The Right Questions About School Choice: Education, Religious
Freedom, and the Common Good, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1281, 1299–1302 (2002); supra note 5
and accompanying text.
395 Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963) (citing W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)).
392
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